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# Guaranteed Minimum Income in Italy and the Fight Against Social Exclusion: A Downside Compromise in Light of the Principles of Equality and Solidarity

Silvio Bologna \*

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**Abstract:** This study examines the Italian social assistance system in the context of antipoverty measures, primarily structured through the minimum income guaranteed by the legislator. Adopting a multi-level perspective, the analysis highlights several critical issues within the legislation enacted over the past decade: administrative barriers to benefit allocation, the lack of coordination between the State and regional authorities in developing antipoverty strategies, and discriminatory practices against immigrants. The author concludes that these factors collectively hinder efforts to address the “poverty trap”.

**Keywords:** *Minimum income guaranteed; Poverty; Social exclusion; Italy; Discrimination*

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## 1. Tackling Social Exclusion in Italy: Socio-Economic Data and Theoretical Models

Statistical data clearly demonstrate that poverty and social exclusion in Italy have reached devastating proportions. According to a Eurostat survey, Italy exceeds the European average of poverty risk, with 28.3% of the population (compared to the EU average of 24.4%) exposed to the risks of income poverty and poverty even after intervention from social services. This is either because individuals experience specific material deprivations or because they live in families with low work intensity<sup>1</sup>. The situation is no less concerning according to data from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). A 2015 survey reveals that 7.6% of the population has experienced absolute poverty, unable to afford essential goods and services to maintain a dignified standard of living, while 10.4% of families suffer from relative poverty, with their purchases falling below the national average<sup>2</sup>.

The geographic distribution of poverty presents the most striking data. EU reports clearly show that social exclusion particularly threatens the southern regions of Italy, where, in Sicily (55.3%), Campania (49%), and Calabria (43.5%), the rate of poverty risk and material deprivation is 20% higher than the national average<sup>3</sup>. In recent years, this geographical gap has widened following the pandemic and the economic turmoil caused by high inflation and rising prices of essential goods<sup>4</sup>. According to a Censis survey, 9.8% of Italians over 18 live in households where income is insufficient to cover monthly expenses. Additionally, 8.4% of Italians are experiencing food poverty, 9.5% energy poverty, and 2.7 million adults face financial hardship related to eye care. These are just a few examples of specific forms of poverty, which help explain the growing complexity of social hardship, beyond merely economic factors<sup>5</sup>.

The interpretation of these data must be approached from a dual perspective, considering not only Italy's specific macroeconomic context but also the broader transformation of Western capitalism. More

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<sup>1</sup> See Eurostat, *People at risk of poverty or social exclusion – Statistics explained*, 2015, [www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat](http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat).

<sup>2</sup> See Istat, *La povertà in Italia. Anno 2015*, [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it).

<sup>3</sup> See Commissione Europea, *Relazione per paese relativa all'Italia 2016 comprensiva dell'esame approfondito sulla prevenzione e correzione degli squilibri macroeconomici*, SWD (2016) 81 final, Bruxelles, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2016, 90 et seq.

<sup>4</sup> Istat, *Torna a crescere la povertà assoluta*, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2021, [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it).

<sup>5</sup> Censis, *Il capitolo «Il sistema di welfare» del 58° Rapporto Censis sulla situazione sociale del Paese/2024*, 6<sup>th</sup> December 2024, [www.censis.it](http://www.censis.it).



precisely, the spread of poverty and social exclusion is not solely the result of weaknesses within the Italian economy and labour market. Contributing factors include the absence of public investment programmes aimed at economic recovery, the prevalence of corruption and organised crime in certain regions, and a lack of investment in research and development by companies. Furthermore, Italy's labour market is not immune to the 'Great Transformation' of capitalism: the digitisation of the economy (including platform work, Industry and Logistics 4.0, and Artificial Intelligence) and the delocalisation of production resulting from global marketisation have significantly eroded employment rates, with domestic labour increasingly replaced either by machines or workers from developing countries across various economic sectors.

Additionally, even those in employment experience forms of social exclusion. Since the 1980s<sup>6</sup>, the liberalisation of the labour market has led to the introduction of various employment contracts (fixed-term, temporary, zero-hour contracts) that fail to ensure job stability and social security.

Lastly, the rigid monetarist policy and the 'dogma' of low inflation rates promoted by EU institutions act as obstacles to expansive macroeconomic policies aimed at raising wages and improving the quality of social services<sup>7</sup>. In this context, wage growth in Italy has been modest in comparison to other EU Member States in recent years<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, the lack of legislation concerning trade union representativeness and the absence of a binding mechanism on the general efficacy of collective agreements has resulted in very modest wage growth, exacerbating the issue of low-paid workers<sup>9</sup>. Less representative trade unions and employers' associations typically agree on wages lower than those set by the more representative unions.

In this context of declining employment and economic wealth, which supports the notion of an irreversible crisis in the Taylorist-Fordist socio-economic compromise<sup>10</sup>, it is crucial to reconsider the protective

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<sup>6</sup> A. Supiot, *L'esprit de Philadelphie. La justice sociale face au marché total*, Seuil, Paris, 2010, 32 et seq.

<sup>7</sup> L. Cavallaro, *A cosa serve l'articolo 18*, Manifesto libri, Roma, 2012, 61 et seq.

<sup>8</sup> C. Arena, *Eurostat. L'Italia è l'unico Paese europeo in cui le retribuzioni orarie sono in calo*, *Avvenire*, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2024.

<sup>9</sup> T. Treu, *Labour law in Italy*, fifth edition, Wolters Kluwer, the Hague, 2016, 98.

<sup>10</sup> F. Martelloni, *Il reddito di cittadinanza nel discorso giuslavoristico: le interferenze con la disciplina del rapporto di lavoro*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2014, 193.



institutions of capitalism against poverty originally conceived in both the Bismarck and Beveridge models as responses to temporary unemployment. In short, the two theoretical models of basic income and guaranteed minimum income have been developed<sup>11</sup>. The former is an unconditional benefit provided to all members of the political community to satisfy their basic needs (food, education, healthcare), simply because they belong to that community, regardless of their status or economic situation. In contrast<sup>12</sup>, the latter is means-tested, granted only to those living in poverty who agree to participate in ‘resocialisation’ projects (such as training or community-based social work).

## 2. The Italian and EU *Grundnorm* against Social Exclusion

The Italian social security system, established by the post-World War II Constitution, assigns marginal importance to the direct fight against poverty and social exclusion. Instead, it primarily reflects the model of a Taylorist society, which is focused on full employment as the economic and political goal, alongside a generous system of redistributive welfare benefiting workers.

Article 38 of the Italian Constitution, which governs social security, is the normative embodiment of this model of productive capitalism centred on work. Specifically, under Article 38, paragraph 1, “Every citizen unable to work and without the necessary means of subsistence is entitled to welfare support.” Social assistance, therefore, is primarily reserved for marginal cases, such as those experiencing psychophysical disabilities that prevent them from working, thus justifying state intervention in the form of monetary transfers. In line with the literal interpretation of Article 38, paragraph 1, the focal point of the social security system has been pensions, which provide workers with adequate resources to meet their

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<sup>11</sup> For a reconstruction of the politic science scholars’ debate on the topic see F. Ravelli, *Il reddito minimo. Tra universalismo e selettività delle tutele*, Giappichelli, Torino, 2018, 35-66.

<sup>12</sup> The model of basic income was theorised by Philipp van Parijs: P. Van Parijs, *Basic income: a simple and powerful idea for the twenty-first century*, *Politics and Society*, 2004, p. 7 ss. In practice, it has been implemented only in some areas of Finland in an experimental way and in Alaska: see G. Impellizzeri, *Finlandia: l’esperimento del reddito di base*; Id., *Il reddito di cittadinanza in Alaska*, in M. Morocco, S. Spattini (eds.), *Diritto al lavoro, contrasto alla povertà, politica attiva, inclusione sociale: le tante (troppe?) funzioni del reddito di cittadinanza all’italiana. Primo commento al d.l n. 4/2019*, Adapt University Press, Bergamo, 2019, 145 et seq.; J. Murto, *Finnish basic income experiment and the simultaneous discussions on the employment rate and continuous learning*, in M.G. Greco (a cura di), *Contrasto alla povertà e rischio di esclusione sociale. Le misure di sostegno al reddito*, Giappichelli, Torino, 2021, 183-190.

needs in the event of old age or involuntary unemployment, in accordance with Article 38, paragraph 2 of the same Constitution<sup>13</sup>.

In the context of today's Italy, which faces challenges such as working poverty, NEETs (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), and high unemployment rates, the legal foundation for a normative action against poverty and social exclusion can be found in the fundamental principle of material equality. In particular, Article 3, paragraph 2, states: "It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country." This provision must be read in conjunction with Article 4 of the 'Bill of Rights', which not only recognises the fundamental right to work but also states that every citizen must contribute to the material and spiritual development of society.

If we follow a systematic interpretation of Articles 4 and 3, paragraph 2 of the Italian *Grundnorm*, we can identify the legal basis for a guaranteed minimum income model as a fundamental tool in the fight against social exclusion<sup>14</sup>. In this framework, monetary transfers to the impoverished are aimed at resocialising individuals through active labour policies that enhance their skills and capabilities, helping them to re-enter the workforce. While the Constitution does not preclude the introduction of a basic income, which would align with the same principles of equality and solidarity, the minimum income model is likely more appropriate at present, given the labour-based foundation of the Italian political community enshrined in Article 1.

Turning to the EU legal framework, several provisions address the fight against social exclusion. Notably, Article 34, paragraph 3, of the Charter of Nice states: "The Union recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources" thereby enshrining the European fundamental

<sup>13</sup> Under Art. 38, par. 2 of the Italian Constitution "Workers have the right to be assured adequate means for their needs and necessities in the case of accidents, illness, disability, old age and involuntary unemployment".

<sup>14</sup> C. Tripodina, *Reddito minimo garantito e reddito di base allo specchio nella Costituzione italiana*, in M.G. Greco (a cura di), *op. cit.*, 63 et seq.; V. Bavaro, *Reddito di cittadinanza, salario minimo legale e diritto sindacale*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2014, 174; M. Ferraresi, *L'Assegno di inclusione tra vincoli costituzionali ed europei in tema di reddito minimo garantito*, *Lavoro diritti Europa*, 2024, 1, 7: in any case, the author argues that the Constitution is not entirely centered on the right to work when ensuring social assistance.

right to a guaranteed minimum income<sup>15</sup>. However, the same Article also stipulates that actions against social exclusion must be carried out “in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices.” Since, under Article 153 TFEU, the EU has no specific competence in social security, aside from coordination, and can only theoretically intervene to harmonise domestic systems with the unanimity principle, the normative policy against poverty rests largely in the hands of individual Member States<sup>16</sup>.

This conclusion is reinforced by the European Pillar of Social Rights, which was prominently presented in 2017 by the EU Commission as a political response to the social deficit within the Union<sup>17</sup>. The Pillar asserts that “Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services,” along with “incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market” (Article 14). Nevertheless, the Pillar remains a non-binding declaration and is not accompanied by concrete EU action, as outlined in the treaties. At best, it may serve as a useful interpretive guideline, should the EU decide to intervene further on the matter via the open method of coordination, which governs EU action on guaranteed minimum income<sup>18</sup>.

The EU’s inadequacy in providing social assistance is further exacerbated by the regulations embedded within the ‘New European Economic Governance’. These tools, which include both soft and hard law (such as the Europlus Pact, ECB letters, Six-Pack and Two-Pack Regulations), sometimes overlap between EU and international law (e.g., the Fiscal Compact Treaty and Memoranda of Understanding). They impose significant constraints on state spending, particularly in Southern Europe, in the aftermath of the 2010 Great Recession<sup>19</sup>. During this period, the

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<sup>15</sup> See G. Bronzini, *Il reddito di cittadinanza, tra aspetti definitivi ed esperienze applicative*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2014, 14.

<sup>16</sup> See J.L. Monereo Pérez, *Artículo 34*, in C. Monereo Atienza, J.L. Monereo Pérez (dir.), *La Europa de los derechos. Estudio sistemático de la Carta de los derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea*, Comares, Granada, 2012, 906-907.

<sup>17</sup> See [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights\\_it](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_it).

<sup>18</sup> G. Bronzini, *Il contrasto del rischio di esclusione sociale nel diritto europeo*, in M.G. Greco (a cura di), *op. cit.*, 42.

<sup>19</sup> See T. Schulten, T. Müller, *A new European interventionism? The impact of the new European economic governance on wages and collective bargaining, Social developments in the European Union*, ETUI, Brussels, 2012, 193-194.

emphasis on balancing public finances often took precedence over ensuring the effectiveness of social rights<sup>20</sup>.

These regulations have been revisited in the 2024 reform of the EU Growth and Stability Pact<sup>21</sup>. All EU member states will be required to reduce their debt to 60% of GDP, a stark contrast to the 92.5% debt ratio in the Eurozone as of late 2022. Additionally, they must move towards a structural deficit of 1.5%. It remains unclear how these fiscal constraints will allow the EU to meet the sustainable development goals mentioned in the approved documents by EU institutions, such as the green and digital transitions, social resilience, poverty reduction, and addressing the ageing population. These long-term projects will inevitably impact future generations, for which the use of debt financing would be fully justified<sup>22</sup>.

### 3. The Choice for a Guaranteed Minimum Income: From the Onofri Commission Report to the *Reddito di Inclusione Attiva*

The first theoretical proposal for a social security strategy aimed at combating material deprivation was outlined in a 1997 report by the Onofri Commission, commissioned by the Ministry of Labour to map the transformation of work and the new forms of poverty emerging after the collapse of the First Republic, when a centre-left government governed Italy. In particular, the report emphasised the need for a minimum income as part of a broader strategy for the social inclusion of the most disadvantaged individuals, in combination with other social services interventions<sup>23</sup>.

For a long time, however, the legislator was reluctant to implement the Onofri Commission's recommendations, due to both cultural and financial reasons. Firstly, the legacy of the Bismarckian social security model, based on workers' contributions, posed an obstacle to the introduction of universal welfare schemes funded by taxpayers. Secondly, the shift towards minimum income schemes required a redistribution of social expenditure, a significant challenge given that in 2013, 50.1% of

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<sup>20</sup> S. Giubboni, *Solidarietà e condizionalità nella garanzia dei diritti sociali*, Prisma Economia Società Lavoro, 2023, 1-2, 97-98.

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed analysis of the reform of the Growth and Stability Pact, see S. Menguy, *Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Which changes for the governments?*, *Journal of government and economics*, 2024, 1-11.

<sup>22</sup> G. Pisauo, *La riforma delle regole fiscali europee*, *il Mulino*, 2024, 2, 117.

<sup>23</sup> See Commissione per l'analisi delle compatibilità macroeconomiche della spesa sociale, *Relazione finale*, 28<sup>th</sup> February 1997, available at [www.reforming.it](http://www.reforming.it).

social spending was still allocated to old-age pensions, with only 0.7% directed towards anti-social exclusion strategies<sup>24</sup>.

Consequently, all social assistance measures aimed at combating poverty until 2017 were not part of a comprehensive social security reform. Instead, these were sporadic interventions—whose scope was determined by the annual budget bill—targeted solely at the most impoverished families. These included the *reddito minimo di inserimento* (Minimum Insertion Income) established by Legislative Decree no. 237/1998 and the *reddito di ultima istanza* (Income of Last Resort) introduced by Act no. 350/2003. Later, the legislator introduced the *social card* (Law Decree no. 112/2008), a type of credit card for destitute individuals to pay for food and energy tariffs, which was replaced in 2016 by the *SLA* (Sostegno per l’Inclusione Attiva), a temporary social security measure for low-income families.

#### **4. The *Reddito di Cittadinanza* under Law Decree No. 4/2019: Between Continuity and Ambiguity**

Until October 2017, Italy was the only country in the EU, alongside Greece, without a permanent measure to combat social exclusion and poverty, despite several recommendations from the EU on this matter<sup>25</sup>. It was only with Legislative Decree No. 147/2017 that the Italian legislator introduced a structural measure aimed at addressing material deprivation, the *reddito di inclusione attiva* (hereinafter REI).

The REI, one of the last provisions enacted during the centre-left legislature, which saw the alternation of the Letta, Renzi, and Gentiloni governments, was a form of guaranteed minimum income based on a *do ut des* approach: money transfers were contingent on the beneficiary’s engagement in active labour market policies. Unfortunately, an exhaustive evaluation of the measure’s concrete impact is difficult, as it was replaced in March 2019 by the *reddito di cittadinanza* (henceforth RDC) under Law Decree No. 4/2019<sup>26</sup>. In practice, the structural differences between the REI and the RDC are minimal, apart from some technical adjustments, as

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<sup>24</sup> See Istat, *Rapporto annuale 2016*, chapter 5, available at [www.istat.it](http://www.istat.it).

<sup>25</sup> See European Parliament, *Minimum income policies in EU member states*, April 2017, in [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/595365/IPOL\\_STU%282017%29595365\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/595365/IPOL_STU%282017%29595365_EN.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> Law decree no. 4/2019 was converted into law by Act no. 26/2019.

both are based on the same axiological principle of guaranteed minimum income<sup>27</sup>.

The introduction of this new legislative measure and the rebranding of the scheme (from REI to RDC) were driven by political strategy and media propaganda. Firstly, the term *reddito di cittadinanza* literally translates to “basic income” in Italian. Secondly, during the 2018 electoral campaign, the *Movimento Cinque Stelle* presented the RDC as a central pillar of its platform to secure victory in the legislative elections. Thirdly, in the agreement with *Lega Nord* to form a new coalition government, the RDC was presented as a tool for Italian citizens facing hardship, with a total sum of 780 euros for one-person households<sup>28</sup>. In other words, the political strategy of the government was based on a conscious and deliberate misunderstanding: the benefit was presented as unconditional to gain electoral support, even though it was designed as conditional<sup>29</sup> by senior civil servants.

The RDC consisted of two components: firstly, an economic sum dependent on household size and income (higher than the REI), aimed at integrating incomes and assisting with rent payments, ranging from 480 to 9,360 euros per year for households of five or more people; secondly, a personalised social inclusion programme based on the assessment of household members.

In brief, the RDC was based on four main pillars: the measure aimed to tackle poverty not at the individual level, but at the family level, with compliance with income and asset thresholds set by law. Its operation, influenced by the principles of *flexicurity* and active labour market policies, was strictly conditional on the participation of all working-age family

<sup>27</sup> R. Casillo, *Il reddito di cittadinanza nel d.l. 28 gennaio 2019, n. 4: precedenti, luci e ombre*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2019, 558; C. Del Bò, *Reddito di cittadinanza italiano e reddito di cittadinanza correttamente inteso. Chiarimenti concettuali e riflessioni etiche*, in M.G. Greco (a cura di), *op. cit.*, 93; P. Sandulli, *Nuovi modelli di protezione sociale fra istanze risalenti e pretese recenti: profili di criticità e problemi di finanziamento*, *Massimario di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro*, 2019, 629; in a similar vein, see V. Filì, *La sostenibilità del sistema pensionistico italiano tra equilibri ed equilibrismi*, *Massimario di Giurisprudenza del lavoro*, 2018, 35.

<sup>28</sup> See Art. 19 (*Reddito di cittadinanza e pensione di cittadinanza*) of the Contratto per il governo del cambiamento, available at [http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/2018/politica/contratto\\_governo.pdf](http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/2018/politica/contratto_governo.pdf).

<sup>29</sup> C. Del Bò, *Il reddito di cittadinanza tra mito e realtà*, *il Mulino*, 2013, 790: since the original proposal of 2013, for the Movimento Cinque Stelle the “reddito di cittadinanza” was a form of minimum income guaranteed. More in general, on the semantic ambiguities of the language related to measures of fight against poverty see P. Tullini, *Opinioni a confronto sul reddito di cittadinanza. Un dialogo aperto*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2018, 687.



members. As a result of *flexicurity*, the subsidy was granted temporarily for a maximum of 18 months<sup>30</sup>, and applicants were required to accept a “fair job offer”; failure to do so resulted in automatic forfeiture of the benefit. Beneficiaries could refuse the first two job offers, but the third refusal led to the loss of the benefit.

Delving deeper into the technicalities of Act No. 4/2019, the granting and functioning of the RDC could be likened to an actual “hurdle race,” creating the potential for social control over the most disadvantaged families. For example, individuals under 26 could not apply for the measure if they still lived with their parents. Additionally, all family members had to provide an immediate declaration of availability for work—not just the applicant. Furthermore, if the family did not spend the entire amount of the benefit in the designated month, the subsequent monthly payment would be automatically reduced by 20%.

The definition of a “fair job offer” was also highly controversial: an offer was deemed fair and must be accepted if the workplace was located at least 100 km from the applicant’s place of residence during the first 12 months of the benefit. After the first 12 months, the minimum distance increased to 250 km, and in the case of a renewal of the benefit, the offer could come from anywhere within the national territory.

Given that the maximum amount of the RDC was 780 euros for one-person households, and that the highest unemployment and poverty rates were concentrated in Southern Italy, the legislator seemingly envisaged a forced migration of the workforce from Southern to Northern Italy, where demand for workers was higher<sup>31</sup>. In practice, however, this did not occur, as there was a mismatch between labour demand and supply. Most RDC recipients had limited skills due to their previous work experience and social backgrounds. Moreover, the reach of public employment services as an effective means of matching labour demand and supply was limited.

In the spirit of *flexicurity* and conditionality, the strategy to combat poverty was not simply a matter of providing money for no more than 18 months. The RDC was framed as a pathway to social and employment inclusion, requiring an initial assessment of the family to evaluate living conditions, employability, education, and training. Based on this assessment, a personalised social inclusion programme was designed by public

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<sup>30</sup> Under Art. 3 par. 6 of Law decree no. 4/2019, it was possible to renew the RDC after a suspension of one month before the same renewal.

<sup>31</sup> R. Ciccarelli, *Il reddito del controllo sociale: contro i giovani, sanziona i poveri, sorveglia gli affetti*, *Il manifesto*, 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2019.



administrations, with the goal of helping applicants access the labour market through participation in specific activities. The related conditionality mechanism was rigid, placing excessive emphasis on the role of the family unit in the implementation of the measure<sup>32</sup>. All family members—not just the applicant—were required to provide an immediate declaration of availability for work to the relevant authority. Furthermore, the entire family could lose the benefit if one member failed to attend two consecutive meetings with social services without a valid justification, or if they did not sign the declaration of availability for work.

Another significant issue was the lack of sufficient financial and human resources allocated to the administrative authority responsible for implementing the personalised social inclusion programme—the *centri per l'impiego* (employment centres), managed by regional authorities. These centres lacked the necessary resources to meet the ambitious goals set out by the RDC. Comparatively, Italy was far behind Germany, which allocated 12 billion euros annually to fund its public employment services (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*), employing approximately 111,000 staff<sup>33</sup>. Public investment in this regard was modest and inadequate. For example, Law Decree No. 4/2019 allocated only 160 million euros for 2019, 130 million euros for 2020, and 50 million euros for 2021. In response, the ANPAL (National Agency for Active Labour Policies) launched a recruitment campaign for 3,000 “navigators” to support the *centri per l'impiego* in managing RDC-related activities<sup>34</sup>. However, the recruitment of “navigators”—temporary workers under collaboration contracts until April 2021—was merely a stopgap measure, underscoring the need for a broader reform of Italy’s social security and labour market policies. Moreover, the employment contracts of navigators were not renewed upon expiry, and the ambitious plan to create a “federal agency” to tackle unemployment was ultimately abandoned.

A further challenge in implementing an effective strategy to combat poverty lies in Italy’s regionalised institutional structure. Following the 2001 constitutional reform<sup>35</sup> and earlier 1990s legislation, social assistance

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<sup>32</sup> P. Pascucci, *Note critiche sparse a margine del reddito di cittadinanza*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2020, 280.

<sup>33</sup> D. De Masi, *Inclusione e cittadinanza*, *Diritti Lavori Mercati*, 2019, 370.

<sup>34</sup> See Anpal, *Avviso pubblico procedura selettiva pubblica per il conferimento di n. 3000 incarichi di collaborazione ex art. 12 del Decreto Legge 28 gennaio 2019, n. 4, convertito in legge con modificazioni dalla Legge 28 marzo 2019, n. 26 recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di Reddito di cittadinanza e di Pensioni*, available at <https://www.anpalservizi.it/home>.

<sup>35</sup> S. Bologna, *Internal coordination of social security in Italy*, *European Journal of Social security*, 2019, 142-143.

is a shared responsibility between the State and the Regions. Under Article 117 of the Italian Constitution, the State determines the basic levels of benefits related to civil and social entitlements that must be guaranteed throughout the national territory. However, individual regions can enhance these benefits depending on their financial resources.

In this context, the RDC (like its predecessor, the REI) represented the basic level of benefits in the fight against poverty, but it was only implemented effectively by certain regions with higher spending capacities, such as Emilia-Romagna, Friuli, Puglia, and the Province of Trento. In brief, some regions increased the national economic benefit or expanded the scope of beneficiaries<sup>36</sup>. This fragmented system can lead to inequalities in the battle against social exclusion, as the extent of protection ultimately depends on the region in which the disadvantaged person resides. Local social benefits cannot be transferred to another region if the person moves, thus creating a paradox: the more developed regions, with higher spending capacities, are better positioned to combat social exclusion than the poorer regions, where the struggle against poverty is more urgent and much needed.

### **5. The *Assegno di Inclusione*: A Downside Maquillage of the Reddito di Cittadinanza**

As previously outlined, the RDC was characterised by a dual objective: firstly, it served as a social assistance measure to combat social exclusion; secondly, it functioned as an active labour market ‘tool’ to enhance the skills of individuals seeking employment. According to data from the Bank of Italy, it significantly contributed to supporting the income of families and mitigated the negative impact of the pandemic<sup>37</sup>.

However, in terms of active labour market policies, the measure did not effectively activate the unemployed for several reasons: firstly, the weak demand for labour in the southern parts of Italy, where the majority of RDC applicants resided; secondly, delays in empowering the public bodies responsible for facilitating the match between labour demand and supply; and finally, the financial amounts of the RDC led to an effective marginal

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<sup>36</sup> On the regional measures against poverty, see S. Laforgia, *I dispositivi regionali di contrasto alla povertà: dalla periferia al centro... e ritorno*, *Variazioni su Temi di Diritto del Lavoro*, 2019, 489-507.

<sup>37</sup> G. Bovini, E. Dicarlo, A. Tomasi, *Banca d'Italia Occasional papers. La revisione delle misure di contrasto alla povertà in Italia*, no. 820, December 2023, 5.

tax rate that discouraged labour supply, as in many cases, an increase in labour income resulted in an equal reduction in the subsidy<sup>38</sup>.

With Law Decree No. 48/2023<sup>39</sup>, the new right-wing government led by Giorgia Meloni reshaped the legislative framework for national social assistance measures against poverty and social exclusion. As of 1st January 2024, the “Allowance of Inclusion” (Assegno di Inclusione, hereinafter ADI) replaced the RDC. This measure, more selective<sup>40</sup> and structured into two components—income integration and tenancy support—represents a form of minimum income guarantee<sup>41</sup> that is less generous than the RDC<sup>42</sup>. The ADI will be granted for up to 18 months, and, after a month of suspension, it can be renewed for up to 12 months (18 months under the RDC). Moreover, access to the ADI is subject to more restrictive personal and age criteria than those for the RDC<sup>43</sup>: the benefit is now available only to poor households with disabled individuals, minors, or those over 60 years of age.

The logic of conditionality has been exacerbated<sup>44</sup>: to retain the benefit, the applicant must accept the first job offer with a permanent employment contract, deemed adequate anywhere in the national territory. Additionally, the sanctioning approach to participation in active policy programmes is evident in Article 4.5, where submission is regarded as a burden rather than an opportunity. In fact, “every ninety days, beneficiaries are required to report to employment centres to update their status,” and in the event of absence, “the economic benefit is suspended.” Furthermore, receiving the allowance requires the signing of the “activation pact,” the “inclusion pact,” and the “customised service pact,”

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<sup>38</sup> G. Bovini, E. Dicarlo, A. Tomasi, *op. cit.*, 6.

<sup>39</sup> Law-decree no. 48/2023 was converted into Law no. 85/2023.

<sup>40</sup> Under Art. 1, par. 2 Law decree no. 48/2023 the inclusion allowance is “a social and labour inclusion measure, conditional on means testing and adherence to a personalised pathway of activation and social and labour inclusion”.

<sup>41</sup> A. Morrone, *I reati in materia di assegno di inclusione e supporto per la formazione e il lavoro*, *Lavoro e diritto*, 2024, 383.

<sup>42</sup> M. Esposito, C. Di Carluccio, *Attivazione, inclusione e condizionalità nel PNRR*, *Lavoro e diritto*, 2023, 281, *sub note 4*; G. Bronzini, *La controriforma del Reddito di cittadinanza alla luce delle Raccomandazioni e delle fonti sovranazionali dell’Unione Europea*, *Prisma Economia Lavoro Società*, 2023, 1-2, 21; A. Sartori, *Misure di inclusione sociale e lavorativa dopo il reddito di cittadinanza. Back to the future or to the past?*, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2023, 744.

<sup>43</sup> For further details see H. Caroli Casavola, *Il congedo del Reddito di cittadinanza e il passaggio al Welfare condizionale*, *Giornale di diritto amministrativo*, 2023, 610.

<sup>44</sup> E. Gragnoli, *Il lavoro e la rendita, il reddito di inclusione e il dovere di attivazione*, *Argomenti di diritto del lavoro*, 2023, 915.

resulting in a flood of e-mail communications between municipalities and regional employment structures.

What is particularly notable is the division between social assistance and active labour market measures. For adults (18-59 years old) experiencing material deprivation, the legislator has introduced the Support for Training and Work (Supporto per la Formazione e il Lavoro, henceforth SFL). This benefit is targeted at members of families who have declared themselves to be “employable” or who do not have vulnerable members that would otherwise qualify for the ADI.

Specifically, the measure aims to encourage the participation of “employable” poor individuals in training projects, qualification, retraining, vocational guidance, and support for work and active employment policies. The monthly amount of the benefit is €350, granted by the Italian social security agency if the applicant participates in activation courses for up to 12 months, with no possibility of renewal.

In summary, the legislator distinguishes between families that are not in a position to work, who are eligible for the more robust ADI measure, families whose members are potentially able to work, who are eligible for job activation measures, and families receiving the SFL.

## **6. Minimum Income Guaranteed and Discrimination Against Immigrants: An Attack on the Principle of Equality**

Since the early 2000s, all coalition governments, both centre-left and centre-right, have drafted a social assistance model with various barriers for non-EU citizens in terms of access to different measures, including the RDC or ADI<sup>45</sup>. In particular, the subjective requirements for applying for the RDC were clearly part of a broader political strategy based on chauvinism and financial savings enacted by the government that introduced the measure, which was never amended.

Potential claimants who were neither Italian nor EU citizens had to hold an “EU green card” or have been granted international protection (political asylum or subsidiary protection) and had to have been residents in Italy for at least ten years, with the last two consecutive, before applying for the benefit. Furthermore, as the benefit could not be claimed by families possessing specific assets or whose income exceeded a certain

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<sup>45</sup> S. Bologna, *Lavoro e sicurezza sociale dei migranti economici: l'eguaglianza imperfetta*, in G. De Marzo, F. Parisi (a cura di), *Diritto e immigrazione. Un quadro aggiornato delle questioni più attuali e rilevanti. Il foro italiano. Gli speciali 3/2021*, La Tribuna, Piacenza, 2021, 292; W. Chiaromonte, *Lavoro e diritti sociali degli stranieri*, Giappichelli, Torino, 231.

threshold, immigrants from certain countries were required to present a statement issued by their home country's government, translated into Italian and ratified by the Italian consular authority, certifying that they did not own assets or income in their country of origin<sup>46</sup>.

Apart from political considerations, this measure starkly contradicted international, European, and constitutional law, as it represented a clear violation of the principles of equality and non-discrimination based on nationality. From a multi-level perspective, the provision first violated Article 10 of ILO Convention No. 143/1975 on migrant workers<sup>47</sup>, ratified by Italy, which unconditionally sets the principle of equal opportunities and treatment between regular immigrants and national workers concerning employment conditions and social security benefits<sup>48</sup>. Moreover, in the regional context, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), based on property rights, if a member state of the Council of Europe introduces a particular welfare measure, it cannot apply discriminatory treatment based on nationality<sup>49</sup>.

Finally, the Italian legislator also violated EU anti-discrimination law, as outlined in Article 12 of Directive 2011/98<sup>50</sup> and the related jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Regular immigrants are fully equal to national and EU citizens when it comes to receiving family and social assistance benefits unless the state explicitly waives this general rule in very limited circumstances<sup>51</sup>. The ECJ has also condemned Italy for its

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<sup>46</sup> In particular, the mandatory certificate was addressed to citizens of the following countries: Bhutan; Republic of Korea; Republic of Fiji; Japan; Hong Kong; Iceland; Kosovo; Kirghizistan; Kuwait; Malaysia; New Zealand; Qatar; Ruanda; S. Marino; Saint Lucia; Singapore; Switzerland; Taiwan and Kingdom of Tonga.

<sup>47</sup> See ILO, *Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers*.

<sup>48</sup> A. Garilli, *La sicurezza sociale degli immigrati: alla ricerca della solidarietà perduta*, *Rivista del Diritto della Sicurezza Sociale*, 2020, 252.

<sup>49</sup> See ECHR 16.9.1996, no. 17371/90, *Gaygusuz vs Austria*; ECHR 30.9.2003, no. 40892/98, *Kova Poirrez vs France*; ECHR 29.10.2009, no. 29137/06, *Amer vs France*. All judgments are available at [www.echr.coe.int](http://www.echr.coe.int). Decisions were based on Art. 14 of the ECHR and Protocol no. 1 of the ECHR on property rights.

<sup>50</sup> P. Bozzao, *Reddito di cittadinanza e laboriosità*, *Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali*, 2020, 14.

<sup>51</sup> See art. 12.2 of dir. 2011/98: Member States may decide that family benefits shall not apply to third-country nationals who have been authorised to work in the territory of a Member State for a period not exceeding six months. No other derogations to the right to equal treatment regarding social assistance are contained in this provision. Even in connection with these exceptions (i.e., the holding of a permit of 5 months), the ECJ ruled that these waivers must be read strictly and can be relied on only if the authorities of the Member State concerned responsible for the implementation of that directive have

legislation on benefits for households with at least three children, which it deemed discriminatory under Directive 2011/98, as entitlement was only granted to third-country nationals with a long-term EU residence permit<sup>52</sup>. Moreover, the provision set out in the directive reflects the general principle of equal treatment outlined in Article 20 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which establishes that comparable situations should not be treated differently, and that different situations should not be treated the same way unless such differential treatment is objectively justifiable and proportionate<sup>53</sup>. In this regard, the ECJ ruled that Article 20 of the Nice Charter also applies to third-country nationals in situations falling within the scope of Union law<sup>54</sup>.

Concerning Italian anti-poverty measures, the ECJ recently declared the rules on the RDC related to the ten-year residency requirement, the final two of which must be consecutive, to be contrary to European Union law<sup>55</sup>. In the Court's view, this mechanism represents indirect discrimination in light of Article 11.1.d of Directive 2003/109/EC, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. In practice, this measure places all nationals at an advantage and creates a form of discrimination prohibited by the same directive, according to which long-term residents are entitled to equal treatment with nationals in terms of social security, social assistance, and social protection as defined by national law. The Court also considered the RDC

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stated clearly that they intended to rely on them: see Case C-449/16, *Del Rosario Martínez Silva*, ECLI:EU:C:2017:485, pars. 29 and 30 and Case C-302/19, *INPS v WS*, ECLI:EU:C:2020:957, par. 26.

<sup>52</sup> See ECJ, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2017, *Kerly Del Rosario Martínez Silva v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)*, *Comune di Genova*, cit.

<sup>53</sup> H. Verscheuren, *Equal treatment as an instrument of integration. The CJEU's case law on social rights for third-country nationals under the EU migration directives*, *European Journal of Social Security*, 2023, 245.

<sup>54</sup> Opinion 1/17 CETA ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, pars. 169 to 177 and Case C-930/19 X v Belgian State, ECLI:EU: C:2021:657, par. 54.

<sup>55</sup> ECJ, 29<sup>th</sup> July 2024, *CU-ND*, C-112/22 and C-223/22. Subsequently, some Italian courts, which had suspended proceedings pending the ECJ ruling, have accepted the appeals on the basis of the reasons set out by the ECJ recognizing the illegality of the requirement of ten years' residence. Therefore, they have ordered the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) the payment of sums that had been returned by beneficiaries to whom the measure had been withdrawn for the lack of residence criterion, as well as the sentence to pay the remaining measure at the withdrawal. See Tribunal of Turin, 6<sup>th</sup> November 2024, and Tribunal of Milan, 19<sup>th</sup> September 2024, both in *www.asgi.it*.



to be a social assistance measure because it enables individuals to meet basic needs such as food, accommodation, and healthcare<sup>56</sup>.

In recent years, the Italian Constitutional Court has declared several social assistance laws unconstitutional, particularly those that recognised benefits only for immigrants legally residing in Italy for at least five or ten years. These decisions have been based not only on ECHR and ECJ jurisprudence but also on the constitutional principles of material equality and reasonableness<sup>57</sup>. According to the Court, in situations of extreme material deprivation, the criterion of nationality does not provide an objective justification for discrimination against third-country nationals, as the legal fight against social exclusion – a matter concerning an individual's basic needs – should not differentiate between individuals based on nationality<sup>58</sup>.

However, the Constitutional Court has since changed its stance, adopting more restrained positions, as demonstrated in a judgment on the social pension, a social security benefit for elderly individuals (over 67 years old) with no income who have resided in Italy for at least ten years, or for immigrants with a long-term residence permit. The Court fully legitimised residential restrictions for non-EU citizens, stating that states should only grant access to social benefits in compliance with the principle of national solidarity if the beneficiaries can prove they are sufficiently integrated into the host society. This integration could be demonstrated by contributing to the financing of these benefits for a certain period or by proving a sufficient level of integration<sup>59</sup>.

In relation to the RDC, the Constitutional Court deemed it reasonable to grant the benefit only to non-EU citizens with a long-term residence

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<sup>56</sup> ECJ, 24 April 2012, *Kamberaj*, C-571/10, pars. 86-92.

<sup>57</sup> V. Ferrante, *È incostituzionale l'esclusione dei cittadini extra-UE dai benefici sociali: si apre la via all'eguaglianza sostanziale?*, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2018, 749.

<sup>58</sup> See, i.e., Constitutional Court decisions 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2024, no. 147; 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2023, no. 77; 11<sup>th</sup> January 2022, no. 54; 25<sup>th</sup> July 2018, no. 166; 30<sup>th</sup> May 2018, no. 107; 30<sup>th</sup> May 2018, no. 106, all available at [www.giurcost.org](http://www.giurcost.org).

<sup>59</sup> See Constitutional Court 15<sup>th</sup> March 2019, no. 50, *Rivista giuridica del lavoro*, 2019, II, 675, with obs. by Carla Spinelli, *La sentenza n. 50/2019: cronaca di un inaspettato arresto nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale in materia di prestazioni sociali degli stranieri*. It should be noted, however, that in the field of social assistance (and also in areas other than income support benefits), judges of first instance and Court of appeals are unanimous in considering long-term residence in the Italian/regional/municipal territory as indirect discrimination against immigrants: in recent times, see, i.e., Tribunal of Padua, 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2025; Tribunal of Milan, 29<sup>th</sup> June 2023, both in [www.asgi.it](http://www.asgi.it).



permit<sup>60</sup>. It argued that the goal of the measure – to combat poverty – takes precedence over the goal of employability. Therefore, since the job activation programme is not short-term (and the RDC lasts at least 18 months), the decision to exclude legally resident foreigners without established roots in the country could not be considered unreasonable. The impression is that, beneath the principle of reasonableness, the Court sought to legitimise a politically structured measure designed to contain public expenditure.

The legislator has attempted to reduce the discriminatory impact of the ADI, which replaced the RDC as a national measure against poverty from January 2024. Non-EU citizens with a long-term residence permit can now apply, but the residence requirement has been halved, reduced to five years, with a requirement to have lived in Italy for at least two uninterrupted years. Furthermore, individuals with international protection status are also entitled to receive the benefit. These changes were introduced not in response to the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence but to comply with the European Court of Justice's judgment on the RDC and to end the infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission against Italy in relation to the same RDC<sup>61</sup>. Nevertheless, the ADI remains structured as a discriminatory measure. Indeed, according to Article 12 of Directive 2011/98, Member States may limit equal treatment in the area of social security, but not for “third-country workers who are in employment or who have been employed for a minimum period of six months, third-country nationals admitted for the purpose of study, or third-country nationals allowed to work on the basis of a visa”.<sup>62</sup>

## 7. Concluding Remarks: The ‘Obstacle Race’ Against Poverty

Without a doubt, the recent introduction of domestic measures against poverty has filled a significant gap compared to other EU Member States.

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<sup>60</sup> See Constitutional Court 25<sup>th</sup> January 2022, no. 19, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2022, 75, with obs. by A. Garilli, S. Bologna, *Migranti e lotta alla povertà. La Corte costituzionale nega il reddito di cittadinanza ai titolari del permesso di soggiorno per ricerca di un'occupazione*.

<sup>61</sup> See proceedings of infringement 2022/4024 of 15<sup>th</sup> February 2023, available at [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf\\_23\\_525](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_23_525).

<sup>62</sup> Categories excluded from the scope of directive 2011/98 are: third-countries family members of Union citizens, posted workers, seasonal workers and au pairs, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection or international protection, long-term residents and self-employed persons (art. 3.2).

As noted earlier, Italy, along with Greece, was the only country without structural measures against material deprivation. From the perspective of fundamental social rights and political sustainability, all the measures – REI, RDC, and ADI – are highly critical and even problematic. As we have seen, the severe conditionality mechanisms affecting families cannot encourage the most disadvantaged groups to apply for benefits. Indeed, the ADI, currently in force, is a categorical benefit, as it is directed only at families with certain vulnerabilities that the legislator considers deserving of enhanced protection. This measure does not appear to align with the recent Recommendation of the Council of the European Union<sup>63</sup>, which, though non-legally binding, advocates for general measures that guarantee a life of dignity, even if conditioned by beneficiary activation<sup>64</sup>.

Furthermore, the administrative centres for employment services lack the necessary human and financial resources to effectively implement a reintegration strategy into the labour market. There is, therefore, a risk that the ADI, like its predecessor, the RDC, will fail to break the ‘poverty trap’ in which working poor, NEETs (Not in Education, Employment or Training), and the unemployed remain trapped. Lastly, the benefit cannot, in practice, be accessed by a large portion of regular immigrants due to the long-term residence permit requirement, in violation of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination enshrined in EU law and in the Italian Constitution.

What is also concerning is that economic benefits have not been integrated into a multidimensional strategy against material deprivation, which is not merely a matter of employment and minimum income<sup>65</sup>. Especially in the Southern part of the country – the most disadvantaged area – an effective strategy against social exclusion cannot ignore issues such as school dropout, undeclared work, and the improvement of essential services, which are often left in the hands of private entities (e.g.,

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<sup>63</sup> See Council of the European Union, Recommendation of 30 January 2023 on adequate minimum income ensuring active inclusion, 2023/C 41/01, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0203%2801%29>.

<sup>64</sup> A. Sartori, *op. cit.*, 770-771; C. Saraceno, *Dal Reddito di Cittadinanza all’Assegno di inclusione e al Supporto per la formazione e il lavoro*, *Prisma Economia Società Lavoro*, 2023, 1-2, 41.

<sup>65</sup> C. Saraceno, *Politiche per le famiglie e per i minori come strumento di contrasto alla povertà*, in VV.AA., *Reddito di cittadinanza e oltre. Per contrastare la povertà combinare più politiche*, [www.welforum.it](http://www.welforum.it), who suggests more efficacious measures for the employment of women and more integrated benefits for children; S. Caffio, *Povertà, reddito e occupazione*, Adapt University Press, Bergamo, 2023, 250, who highlights that education is the pillar to ensure a work of quality.

healthcare). In other words, the granting of subsidies is not the only strategy. It could, however, be effectively accompanied by Keynesian economic policies aimed at stimulating both the right to work and economic consumption, as well as boosting internal demand from families, businesses, and consumers. Unfortunately, the ADI reiterates the centrality of the subsidy and caters to the emotional demands of a significant portion of public opinion<sup>66</sup> (where the poor are seen as lazy and migrants as free riders), thus reinforcing a state-driven approach that seeks to reduce poverty primarily through financial transfers.

There are, of course, significant issues of financial and political sustainability<sup>67</sup> in such an ambitious plan, which is the result of both internal and external pressures – including European economic governance and a strict neoliberal approach to welfare by domestic politicians. These factors severely limit the emancipatory potential of the Constitution and the fundamental principles of EU law regarding social rights. Several proposals have been put forward by scholars to address poverty from an integrated perspective, which contrasts with the conditionality mechanisms stemming from the neoliberal approach. These include the reduction of working hours to redistribute work<sup>68</sup>, the introduction of a European unemployment benefit scheme, the creation of a European fund against social exclusion<sup>69</sup>, a minimum income that is not contingent on conditionality (since poor people are not ‘sinners’ to be socially controlled)<sup>70</sup>, and a legally fixed minimum wage, as is the case in other EU countries. The challenge is ambitious, and the Great Social Transformation – to paraphrase Polanyi<sup>71</sup> – now rests in the hands of politics, to avoid the persistence of *a status quo* where equality and solidarity have been eroded, risking conflict between the poor.

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<sup>66</sup> E. Gagnoli, *op. cit.*, 924.

<sup>67</sup> T. Treu, *Sustainable social security. Past and future challenges in social security*, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2018, 622.


<sup>68</sup> P. Alleva, *Usiamo il reddito di cittadinanza per ridurre orario e disoccupazione*, *Il manifesto*, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2019; G. Bronzini, *Il reddito di base e la metamorfosi del lavoro. Il dibattito internazionale ed europeo*, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2018, 701-709.

<sup>69</sup> M. Faioli, *Introduction. The EUBS without States?*, *Economia e Lavoro*, 2017, 1, 7-10; M. Faioli, S. Bologna, *Sull'adeguatezza dell'indennità euro-unitaria di disoccupazione (EUBS)*, *Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale*, 2017, 29-51.

<sup>70</sup> A. Somma, *Contro il reddito di cittadinanza*, in A. Somma (a cura di), *Lavoro alla spina, welfare à la carte. Lavoro e Stato sociale ai tempi della gig economy*, Meltemi, Milano, 2019, 246-250.

<sup>71</sup> K. Polanyi, *La grande trasformazione*, Einaudi, Torino, 1974.

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