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Industrial Relations and Social Partnership in Wage Regulation in Ukrainian Industries

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Abstract

This article explores the assessment of the rate of development of social partnership in the regulation of wages in Ukraine, as well as its relationship with the material well-being of employees. The rates of development of the social partnership in the regulation of wages in seven industries were assessed. The evaluation results showed that none of the studied industries was in the clusters with high and above-average social partnership development rates. The analysis showed a high positive correlation between the social partnership's development rate and the material well-being of employees. Each of the studied industries has inherent best practices for developing remuneration policies based on social partnership. Policymakers and social parties should examine and disseminate best practices in developing remuneration policies. It becomes a crucial practice for strengthening trust in the institution of social partnership and the ability of parties to create the conditions for decent work.

Keywords: *Industrial Relations, Social Partnership, Social Dialogue, Wages, Collective Agreements.*

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1. Introduction

Social partnership plays an essential role in the regulation of industrial relations. It involves employment, wages, social security, work schedules, health and safety, and working conditions. Wages and social security occupy a special place among these issues. Remuneration of employees plays a crucial role in creating the proper conditions for the reproduction of the workforce, the professional development of employees, and the provision of adequate living standards (Alsos, Nergaard & Van Den Heuvel¹; Hirsch²; Shambaugh et al.³). The amount of remuneration determines a person's ability to meet needs, improve intellectual, professional, and cultural levels, and maintain health and efficiency. Remuneration remains an important tool for encouraging employees to improve performance and achieve goals (Blumkin et al.⁴; Katovich & Maia⁵; Ozturk et al.⁶).

Social partnership is an effective form of regulation of industrial relations as it promotes employment and security (Marginson & Galetto⁷) and ensures equitable distribution of income (Villanueva⁸). The social partnership maintains the balance of interests of the parties (Karynov et al.⁹), respect for the rights of citizens (Lévesque et al.¹⁰), and facilitates the

¹ K. Alsos, K. Nergaard, & A. Van Den Heuvel, *Collective bargaining as a tool to ensure a living wage. Experiences from the Nordic countries, Transfer: European Review of Labor and Research*, 25, Is. 3, (2019): 351-365.

² D. Hirsch, *The 'living wage' and low income: Can adequate pay contribute to adequate family living standards? Critical Social Policy*, 38, Is. 2, (2018): 367-386.

³ J. Shambaugh, et al. Thirteen facts about wage growth. The Hamilton Project, 2017.

⁴ T. Blumkin, H. Pinhas, & R. Zultan, *Wage Subsidies and Fair Wages, European Economic Review*, 127, (2020).

⁵ E. Katovich, & A. Maia, *The relation between labor productivity and wages in Brazil, Nova Economia*, 28, Is. 1, (2018): 7-38.

⁶ M. Ozturk et al., *How effective are labor wages on labor productivity? An empirical investigation on the construction industry of New Zealand, Technological and Economic Development of Economy*, 26, Is. 1, (2020): 258-270.

⁷ P. Marginson & M. Galetto, *Engaging with flexibility and security: Rediscovering the role of collective bargaining, Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 37, Is. 1, (2016): 95-117.

⁸ E. Villanueva, *Employment and wage effects of extending collective bargaining agreements. IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)*. Is. 136, 2015.

⁹ C. Karynov et al., *Concept, essence and significance of social partnership in the general history of law, Journal of Positive School Psychology*, 6, Is. 6, (2022): 4821-4824.

¹⁰ C. Lévesque et al., *Corporate Social Responsibility and Worker Rights: Institutionalizing Social Dialogue Through International Framework Agreements, Journal of Business Ethics*, 153, (2018): 215-230.

resolution of conflicts (Turner¹¹). Social partnership is the basis for building a democratic society, an effective means of implementing a fair socio-economic policy, and reducing the number and severity of social and labor conflicts.

The development of social dialogue, including through the strengthening positions of all social actors, is one of the main areas covered by the concept of decent work (Anker et. al.¹²; Ghai¹³; Bonnet, Figueiredo & Standing¹⁴; Somavia¹⁵; Tsymbaliuk & Shkoda¹⁶).

Assessments of the current state of industrial relations in Ukraine, the implementation of negotiation procedures, the role of social parties, and the content of collective agreements indicate that, despite the presence of essential practices of negotiating and concluding collective agreements, the institution of social partnership is only in the emerging phase. It is characterized by underdeveloped institutional features.

Despite the widespread practice of collective bargaining at the sectoral level and the high level of coverage of employees by collective agreements at the micro-level in various industries, it is impossible to determine unequivocally the effectiveness of social partnership in ensuring decent work. The effectiveness of social partnership should be analyzed using not only traditional quantitative indicators but also qualitative ones. It is also essential to assess the fulfillment of commitments by the social parties, as this builds the level of employees' trust in social dialogue and social partnership.

This paper, therefore, intends to assess quantitatively and qualitatively the rate of development of social partnership in wage regulation at the sectoral level. It adopts a broader set of indicators compared with existing practices. This paper is structured in the following sections. A literature review focuses on understanding social partnership and its role in the regulation of industrial relations, current trends and problems in collective

¹¹ L. Turner, *Social Partnership in Germany: Lessons for U.S. Labor and Management*, ILR Articles and Chapters, 1993.

¹² R. Anker et. al., *Measuring decent work with statistical indicators: Working Paper*. International Labor Office, Geneva. Is. 2, 2002.

¹³ D. Ghai, *Decent work: Concept and indicators*, *International Labor Review*, 142, Is. 2, (2003): 113-145.

¹⁴ F. Bonnet, J. Figueiredo, & G. Standing, *A family of decent work indexes*, *International Labor Review*, 142, Is. 2, (2003): 213-238.

¹⁵ J. Somavia Address in the International Labor Conference, ILO (Geneva), 87th Session, 1.06.1999.

¹⁶ S. Tsymbaliuk & T. Shkoda, *Labor remuneration in the healthcare sector of Ukraine in terms of decent work concept*, *Employee Relations*, 44, Is.1, (2022): 191-209.

bargaining. The research methodology and analysis procedures are then presented. Based on the set of indicators illustrated, the paper provides comparative analyses of social dialogue and collective agreements of various industries and a correlation between the rate of development of the social partnership and the material well-being of employees.

2. Literature review

Social partnership is a system of relations in the social and labor sphere in the process of realizing the socio-economic rights of the social parties (Trunova¹⁷). It is directed at harmonizing and protecting the interests of employers and employees (Kolot & Pavlovska¹⁸). The system of social partnership includes institutions and mechanisms, as well as relations, aimed at maintaining the balance of the interests of employers and employees and facilitating their mutually acceptable decisions for achieving individual and social goals (Nelipa¹⁹).

Even though collective bargaining and concluding agreements are fundamental and most visible forms of social partnership, social partnership is a broader concept and can be implemented in other forms, such as joint consultations and resolution of labor conflicts, participation of representatives of the social parties in the social partnership bodies, control over the implementation of collective agreements, participation of employees in the distribution of incomes and the management of social insurance funds (Hetmantseva²⁰; Kolot & Pavlovska²¹).

According to existing literature, social partnership is an effective tool for ensuring working conditions, occupational safety, and health (Kovač²²),

¹⁷ H. Trunova, The concept of social partnership at the present stage, *Scientific Bulletin of Chernivtsi University*, 282, (2005): 59-62.

¹⁸ A. Kolot & O. Pavlovska, Social partnership as an institution for the formation of consolidated social responsibility: theoretical foundations, *Social economy*, Is. 1, (2013): 81-90.

¹⁹ D. Nelipa, Problems of institutionalisation of social partnership in Ukraine, *Scientific Notes of the I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine*, Is. 40, (2008): 197-205.

²⁰ N. Hetmantseva, Social partnership as a way to integrate the interests of social actors, *Entrepreneurship, Economy and Law*, Is. 3, (2016): 82-86.

²¹ A. Kolot & O. Pavlovska, Social partnership as an institution for the formation of consolidated social responsibility: theoretical foundations, *Social economy*, Is. 1, (2013): 81-90.

²² C. Kovač, *Social partnership in occupational safety and health*, *Safety engineering*, 7, Is. 2, (2017): 85-91.

wage (Bosch²³) and gender equality (Deakin et al.²⁴, Madhav & Sankaran²⁵, Villanueva²⁶), social security (Frandsen²⁷), and diversity policies (Cornet & Fatoux²⁸). The social partnership supports sustainable development (Galgóczy²⁹) and economic growth (Teague & Donaghey³⁰; Uhlerová³¹). Collective bargaining relates to various aspects of the activity of enterprises: company performance (Braakmann & Brandl³²), the culture of industrial relations (Signoretti³³), industrial climate (Prins, Stuer, & Gielens³⁴), and productivity (Lucifora & Origo³⁵; Brandl & Braakmann³⁶). Despite the effectiveness of social partnership and collective bargaining in regulating industrial relations, researchers point to an erosion of collective

²³ G. Bosch, *Shrinking collective bargaining coverage, increasing income inequality: A comparison of five EU countries*, *International Labor Review*, 154, Is. 1, (2015): 57-66.

²⁴ S. Deakin et. al., *Are litigation and collective bargaining complements or substitutes for achieving gender equality? A study of the British Equal Pay Act*, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 39, Is. 2, (2015): 381-403.

²⁵ R. Madhav & K. Sankaran, *Gender Equality and Social Dialogue in India. Working Papers*, id:7237. *eSocialSciences*, 2015.

²⁶ E. Villanueva, *Employment and wage effects of extending collective bargaining agreements*, *IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)*, Is. 136, (2015).

²⁷ B.R. Frandsen, *The effects of collective bargaining rights on public employee compensation: evidence from teachers, firefighters, and police*, *ILR Review*, 69, Is. 1, (2015): 84-112.

²⁸ A. Cornet & F. Fatoux, *Trade Unions and Social Dialogue: A Challenge for Diversity Management. Management and Diversity. International Perspectives on Equality, Diversity and Inclusion*, 4, (2017): 231-254.

²⁹ B. Galgóczy, *Just transition on the ground: Challenges and opportunities for social dialogue*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 26, Is. 4, (2020): 367-382.

³⁰ P. Teague & J. Donaghey, *Why has Irish Social Partnership Survived?* *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 47, (2009): 55-78.

³¹ M. Uhlerová, *The role of trade unions and social dialogue during the crisis: the case of Slovakia*. *Central European Journal of Labor Law and Personnel Management*, 1, (2020): 61-76.

³² N. Braakmann, & B. Brandl, *The Efficacy of Hybrid Collective Bargaining Systems: An Analysis of the Impact of Collective Bargaining on Company Performance in Europe*, MPR Paper, 2016.

³³ A. Signoretti, *Analysis of Italian medium-sized enterprises' collective bargaining from an international perspective: Evidence from the manufacturing sector*, *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 37, Is. 4, (2016): 716-738.

³⁴ P. Prins, D. Stuer & T. Gielens, *Revitalizing social dialogue in the workplace: the impact of a cooperative industrial relations climate and sustainable HR practices on reducing employee harm*, *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 31, Is. 13, (2020): 1684-1704.

³⁵ C. Lucifora & F. Origo, *Performance-Related Pay and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Reform in the Structure of Collective Bargaining*, *ILR Review*, 68, Is. 3, (2015): 606-632.

³⁶ B. Brandl & N. Braakmann, *The effects of collective bargaining systems on the productivity function of firms: An analysis of bargaining structures and processes and the implications for policy making*, *Industrial Relations*, 52, (2021): 218-236.

bargaining institutions (Hyman³⁷), reduced employee involvement in trade unions (Bernaciak³⁸; Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman³⁹), a low level of trust in trade unions (Culpepper & Regan⁴⁰), a weakening of collective bargaining in general (Addison et al.⁴¹; Stanojević, Mrčela & Breznik⁴²; Távora & González⁴³; Rodríguez, Rojo & Lucio⁴⁴), and its traditional forms in particular (Anner, Fischer-Daly & Maffie⁴⁵) in different countries under the influence of different factors. These problems are mainly explained by the weak organizational capacities of the social parties and, especially, of the state (Mailand & Due⁴⁶).

Collective bargaining has partly lost its ability to reduce wage inequality in many countries as a result of declining labor power against that of management (Doellgast & Benassi⁴⁷). Difficulties in collective wage bargaining in EU countries pushed trade unions to seek assistance from the state to stabilize wage regulation (Arnholtz, Meardi & Oldervoll⁴⁸).

³⁷ R. Hyman, *What future for industrial relations in Europe?* *Employee Relations*, 40, Is. 4, (2018): 569-579.

³⁸ M. Bernaciak, *Coming full circle? Contestation, social dialogue and trade union politics in Poland. Rough waters – European trade unions in a time of crises*, *European Trade Union Institute*, (2017): 161-183.

³⁹ R. Gumbrell-McCormick & R. Hyman *Trade unions in Western Europe: Hard times, hard choices*. Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁴⁰ P.D. Culpepper & A. Regan, *Why don't governments need trade unions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy*, *Socio-Economic Review*, 12, Is. 4, (2014): 723-745.

⁴¹ J.T. Addison et. al., *The demise of a model? The state of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany*, *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 38, Is. 2, (2017): 193-234.

⁴² M. Stanojević, A.K. Mrčela, & M. Breznik, *Slovenia at the crossroads: Increasing dependence on supranational institutions and the weakening of social dialogue*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 22, Is. 3, (2016): 281-294.

⁴³ I. Távora & P. González, *Labor market regulation and collective bargaining in Portugal during the crisis: Continuity and change*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 22, Is. 3, (2016): 251-265.

⁴⁴ C.J.F. Rodríguez, R.I. Rojo & M.M. Lucio, *Austerity and collective bargaining in Spain: The political and dysfunctional nature of neoliberal deregulation*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 22, Is. 3, (2016): 267-280.

⁴⁵ M. Anner, M. Fischer-Daly & M. Maffie, *Fissured Employment and Network Bargaining: Emerging Employment Relations Dynamics in a Contingent World of Work*, *ILR Review*, 74, Is. 3, (2020): 689-714.

⁴⁶ M. Mailand & J. Due, *Social dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe: Present state and future development*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 10, Is. 2, (2004): 179-197.

⁴⁷ V. Doellgast & C. Benassi, *Collective bargaining*, *Handbook of Research on Employee Voice*, (2020): 239-258.

⁴⁸ J. Arnholtz, G. Meardi & J. Oldervoll, *Collective wage bargaining under strain in northern European construction: Resisting institutional drift?* *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 24, Is. 4, (2018): 341-356.

The core trend in regulating industrial relations is the decentralization of collective bargaining that is observed in Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark (Ibsen & Keune⁴⁹), Italy (Pallini⁵⁰), Lithuania (Blažienė, Kasiliauskas & Guobaitė-Kiršlienė⁵¹), Finland (Jonker-Hoffrén⁵²), Greece (Zisimopoulos, Fagogenis & Economakis⁵³), Spain (Rocha⁵⁴; Rodríguez, Rojo & Lucio⁵⁵), and France (Amable⁵⁶).

Regardless of the scientific discourse on the issue of social and labor relations, the problems of social partnership and collective bargaining in wage regulation remain insufficiently studied and need more theoretical and methodological studies. A limited number of studies contain indicators for assessing social dialogue and social partnership. Most researchers (Lawrence & Ishikawa⁵⁷; Hayter & Stoevska⁵⁸; Oberfichtner & Schnabel⁵⁹) analyzed social dialogue using two groups of indicators: trade union density rate and collective bargaining coverage rate. Kenworthy &

⁴⁹ C. Ibsen & M. Keune, *Organised Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining: Case studies of Germany, Netherlands and Denmark*, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 217, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018.

⁵⁰ M. Pallini, *Italian Industrial Relations: Toward a Strongly Decentralized Collective Bargaining*, *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal*, 38, Is. 1, (2016): 1-12.

⁵¹ I. Blažienė, N. Kasiliauskas & R. Guobaitė-Kiršlienė, *Lithuania: will new legislation increase the role of social dialogue and collective bargaining? Collective Bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame* / edited by Müller, T., Vandaele, K. & Waddington, J. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 2, (2019): 381-401.

⁵² P. Jonker-Hoffrén, *Finland: goodbye centralised bargaining? The emergence of a new industrial bargaining regime*, *Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame*, 1. Brussels, ETUI, (2019): 197-215.

⁵³ I. Zisimopoulos, K. Fagogenis & G. Economakis, *Decentralization of collective bargaining system in Greece: between dismantling, survival and restoration*, *Proceedings of the International Conference of Political Economy*, June 25-28, 2019, Istanbul, Turkey, (2019): 249-259.

⁵⁴ F. Rocha, *Strengthening the decentralisation of collective bargaining in Spain. Between the legal changes and real developments. Multi-employer bargaining under pressure*, *Decentralisation trends in five European countries*, Brussels, European Trade Union Institute, (2018): 225-261.

⁵⁵ C.J.F. Rodríguez, R.I. Rojo & M.M. Lucio, *Austerity and collective bargaining in Spain: The political and dysfunctional nature of neoliberal deregulation*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 22, Is. 3, (2016): 267-280.

⁵⁶ B. Amable, *The Political Economy of the Neoliberal Transformation of French Industrial Relations*, *ILR Review*, 69, Is. 3, (2016): 523-550.

⁵⁷ S. Lawrence & J. Ishikawa, *Social Dialogue Indicators: Trade Union Membership and Collective Bargaining Coverage*, *Statistical Concepts, Methods and Findings*, International Labor Office Working Paper No. 59, 2005.

⁵⁸ S. Hayter & V. Stoevska, *Social Dialogue Indicators*, International Statistical Inquiry 2008-09 Technical Brief. Geneva: ILO, 2011.

⁵⁹ M. Oberfichtner & C. Schnabel, *The German Model of Industrial Relations: (Where) Does It Still Exist? Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 239, Is. 1, (2019): 5-37.

Kittel⁶⁰] suggested measuring social dialogue based on the following indicator categories: associational structure, wage-setting arrangements, participation in public policy, and company-level employee representation. For assessing social partnership, Danylevych & Poplavska⁶¹ suggest using the potential of wages as the possibility to ensure not only the reproduction of labor but also professional development and the improvement of the quality of human capital.

Therefore, the issues of developing tools for assessing the development of social partnership in wage regulation at various levels remain relevant. There is still a lack of research on the impact of social partnership and collective bargaining on material well-being, quality of working life, and the degree of social protection of employees."

3. Method

To assess the rate of development of the social partnership in wage regulation, a set of indicators with established standards is proposed, and methodological principles for calculating individual and integrated indices are developed. The set of indicators with established standards is given in Table 1.

Table 1. Set of indicators with established standards for assessing the rate of development of social partnership in wage regulation at the sectoral level

Indicators	Standard
1. The availability of a sectoral agreement	yes
2. Recognition of the agreement as a legal act of social partnership by all parties	yes
3. Timeliness of concluding a sectoral agreement	yes
4. Designation of officials responsible for implementing provisions	yes
5. Regulation of norms on remuneration according to the legislation, %	→ max (100)
6. Number of obligations of social parties	→ max
7. The ratio of the number of specific obligations to the total number of obligations of the social parties on wages and social security according to the sectoral agreement, %	→ max (100)
8. Obligations to wage growth in the sectoral agreement	→ max (≥110)

⁶⁰ L. Kenworthy & B. Kittel, *Indicators of Social Dialogue: Concepts and Measurements*, ILO Working Paper No. 5, Available at SSRN, 2003.

⁶¹ N. Danylevych, O. Poplavska, *Social responsibility and social partnership in the 4th industrial revolution context: case of Ukraine*. REVESCO. *Revista de Estudios Cooperativos*, 135, 2020.

9. Obligations to increase the share of wages in gross expenditures	Yes
10. Share of basic salary in the remuneration according to the sectoral agreement, %	→ max (>60)
11. The ratio of the basic wage of the worker of the 1st category and the minimum wage provided by law according to the sectoral agreement, %	→ max (≥110)
12. Range of 6-category tariff scale for workers (maximum if there are several tariff scales) according to the sectoral agreement	≥2
13. Range of salary scale for managers and specialists (maximum if there are several salary scales) according to the sectoral agreement	≥4
14. The difference between the basic salaries of workers and specialists of two related categories according to the sectoral agreement, %	≥10
15. Use of analytical methods for assessing positions and jobs during the development of tariff and salary scales according to the sectoral agreement	Yes
16. Use of flexible remuneration systems according to the sectoral agreement	Yes
17. Compliance of the list, amount, and procedure for payment of additional payments and increases to the legal norms and norms of the general agreement	Yes
18. Obligations to implement <i>stock options and profit-sharing plans in enterprises of industry</i> according to the sectoral agreement	Yes
19. Obligations of the social parties to introduce social packages <i>in enterprises of industry</i> according to the sectoral agreement	Yes
20. Obligations of the social parties to introduce social insurance programs <i>in enterprises of industry</i> (number of insurance programs) according to the sectoral agreement	yes (→ max)
21. Obligations of the social parties on providing gender equality in wages according to the sectoral agreement	Yes
22. The rate of coverage of employees by collective agreements on the organizational level in the industry, %	→ max (100)

Source: Compiled by the Authors, 2023.

In February 2021, an expert survey method was used to verify the reliability of the indicators. 13 scientists and professionals in industrial relations were selected as the experts. The expert survey was conducted in the form of a questionnaire. Experts assessed the significance of indicators on a scale from 0 to 7. Table 2 contains the main characteristics of experts.

Table 2. Characteristics of experts

Characteristic	Number of experts
<i>Profession</i>	
• Lecture	8
• Scientist	3
• Professional	2
<i>Total</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Academic status</i>	
• Professor	3
• Associate Professor	6
• None	4
<i>Total</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Degree</i>	
• DSc	5
• PhD	6
• None	2
<i>Total</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Work experience</i>	
• From 10 to 20 years	6
• More than 20 years	7
<i>Total</i>	<i>13</i>

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

Different methodological approaches to the calculation of individual indices (I_i) for various indicators depending on their specifics, units of measurement, and standards are proposed. Individual indices (I_i) for indicators for which the established standards have the wording “yes” or “no” are determined in the following order:

— if the actual value of a certain indicator does not meet the established standard, the unit index (I_i) of this indicator is 0;

— if the actual value of a certain indicator meets the established standard, the unit index (I_i) of this indicator is equal to 1.

If the agreement does not specify the percentage of increase in individual indicators, which reflects the commitment of the social parties to increase indicators (increase in average wages, etc.), the index for this indicator is reduced by half: it equals 0.5.

For the rest of the indicators, the individual indices (I_i) are determined according to the standardization procedure:

$$I_i = \frac{[x_{\text{actual}} - x_{\text{min}}]}{[x_{\text{max}} - x_{\text{min}}]}, \quad (1)$$

where X_{actual} is the actual value of the indicator achieved in a selected industry;

X_{min} - the lowest value for an indicator among the studied industries;

X_{max} - the highest value for an indicator among the studied industries.

The integrated index of the rate of development of the social partnership in wage regulation at the sectoral level (K) is determined by the formula

$$K = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n I_i}{n}, \quad (2)$$

where n is the number of indicators.

The value of the integrated index can be in the range of 0 to 1.

Ranges of values of the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation at the sectoral level:

$$\text{If } K \in \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [0,8; 1] \\ [0,6; 0,8) \\ [0,4; 0,6) \\ [0,2; 0,4) \\ [0; 0,2) \end{array} \right\}, K \in \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{high rate} \\ \text{above-average rate} \\ \text{average rate} \\ \text{below-average} \\ \text{low rate} \end{array} \right\} \quad (3)$$

Comparative analysis of the development of the social partnership in wage regulation was carried out in the following industries: machine-building and instrument-making, chemical and petrochemical, aviation, energy and electrical power, oil and gas, mining and metallurgy, and coal.

Criteria for creating a sample of industries:

- availability of signed sectoral collective agreements;
- representation of industries with a high level of sales revenue and employees.

Studied industries have signed sectoral agreements:

- Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020;
- Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020;
- Sectoral agreement of the aviation industry for 2019-2020;

- Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018;
- Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014;
- Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012;
- Sectoral Agreement of the coal industry (signed in 2001).

4. Results

4.1. Analysis of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation in Industries

One of the criteria for creating the sample of industries to analyze the development level of social partnership in wage regulation is the *availability of a sectoral agreement*. As for this criterion, all studied industries meet the established standard, as they have signed sectoral agreements.

A good tool that obliges to comply with the rules of the sectoral agreement is the *recognition of the agreement as a legal act of social partnership by all parties*.

Analysis of the agreements of the studied industries showed that some of them stipulate that they are legal acts. It applies to the following agreements: the Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020 (article 1.2), the Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018 (article 1.6), and the Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014 (article 1.5). It is positive evidence concerning determining the legal nature of these agreements and the development of the social partnership.

At the same time, both the legislation (article 9 of the Law of Ukraine “On Collective Agreements and Contracts” (Parliament of Ukraine⁶²) and sectoral agreements themselves stipulate that their provisions do not apply to enterprises that did not participate in the negotiation and signing of them. Therefore, despite considering sectoral agreements as *legal* acts by the parties, they cannot be esteemed as such, as their provisions are not binding for all enterprises in the industries.

The following important indicator of assessing the development of the social partnership is the *timeliness of concluding a sectoral agreement*.

⁶² Parliament of Ukraine. *On Collective Agreements and Contracts. The Law of Ukraine*, dated 01.07.1993, № 3356.

At the time of the study, all studied sectoral agreements expired for the period they signed. Three sectoral agreements (in the machine-building and instrument-making, chemical and petrochemical, and aviation industries) expired in 2020.

As for the rest of the agreements, according to the period for which they were signed, they expired more than three years ago. The sectoral agreement of the coal industry was signed in 2001 without a specific time of validity.

Nevertheless, at the time of the study, the provisions of such sectoral agreements remain in force under the Law of Ukraine “On Collective Bargaining Agreements” (Parliament of Ukraine⁴⁴).

In addition, the social parties periodically make changes following legislative changes and the norms of the general agreement, which is regularly renegotiated, although also often “too late”.

The delay of negotiations and extensions of sectoral agreements is usually due to the difficulty of reaching a joint agreement on some issues by the social parties, especially on wages and social security.

The practice of extending the validity of collective agreements that have already expired is widespread at various levels. However, the provisions of collective agreements are now outdated and do not reflect the current socio-economic situation, especially the presence of the lockdown restrictions, the spread of non-traditional forms of employment (remote, home-based work), forced downtime, unpaid leave, the need to ensure occupational safety during the pandemic of COVID-19 and war.

The untimely negotiations negatively characterize collective bargaining in wage regulation. It doesn't contribute to the development of social partnership and social dialogue.

The next indicator for assessing the development of the social partnership is the *designation of officials responsible for implementing provisions by the sectoral agreement*.

On the positive side, all agreements of the studied industries provide for a procedure for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the regulations of the agreement, although some of them do not specify a clear procedure and deadlines for reporting.

One of the best practices is the procedure of control and reporting provided by the Sectoral Agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020. According to the procedure, enterprises submit information on the progress of the agreement implementation twice a year: for the first half of the year — until August 1 of the current year, and for the second half of the year – until March 1 of the following year. Reports on the implementation of the agreement are discussed twice a

year at joint meetings of the commissions, and if necessary, at a joint meeting of the board of the Ministry and the Presidium of the Central Council of the trade union.

Of all the analyzed agreements, only the sectoral agreements of the oil and gas industry and the coal industry specify the responsible persons. The sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry provides for the approval of the persons responsible for the agreement implementation within one month of signing the agreement. As for the rest of the agreements, they contain a standard expression that the parties are responsible for implementing the provisions, without specifying the officials.

The lack of provisions on the designation of officials responsible for implementing provisions may lead to non-compliance with provisions by the parties, reducing the effectiveness of the sectoral agreement as a legal act of social partnership. This, in turn, may lead to a decline in confidence in social partnership as a tool for regulating industrial relations, and wages in particular.

The next indicator for assessing the development of the social partnership is the *regulation by a sectoral agreement of norms on remuneration according to the legislation, in particular, the Law of Ukraine "On Collective Agreements and Contracts"*.

The results of the assessment of the regulation of norms on remuneration according to the legislation by sectoral agreements in the studied industries are given in Table 3.

Table 3. Regulation of Remuneration under Legislation, by Sectoral Agreements in the Industries Examined

Norms, which should be regulated by the sectoral agreement according to the Law of Ukraine «On Collective Agreements and Contracts»	Assessment (yes, no, partially)						
	Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020	Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020	Sectoral agreement of the aviation industry for 2019-2020	Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018	Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014	Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012	Sectoral agreement of the coal industry
1. Minimum wage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

guarantees per the qualification based on a unified wages scale							
2. Minimum amounts of additional payments and increases, taking into account the specifics, work conditions of professional groups and categories of employees	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
3. Minimum social guarantees, compensations, benefits	+	+	+	+	+	+	±
4. Utilities and amenities, medical, cultural services	±	+	+	+	+	+	+
5. Rehabilitation and recreation	±	+	+	+	+	+	+
6. Conditions for the growth of wage funds	±	-	+	±	+	+	+
7. Inter-qualification (inter-job) ratios in labor remuneration	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
8. Ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men	+	+	+	-	-	+	-
Percentage of norms regulated by the sectoral agreement, %	50	75	87.5	62.5	75	87.5	62.5

Source: Compiled by the authors, 2023.

According to this indicator, the best provisions are declared in sectoral agreements of the aviation industry and the mining and metallurgical industry, which regulate 87.5% of the norms provided by the law. The worst situation is in the coal and machine-building and instrument-making industries: only half of the norms on wages are regulated by sectoral agreements.

All sectoral agreements regulate the minimum amounts of additional payments and increases, considering the specifics, and work conditions of professional groups, and categories of employees.

Also, all sectoral agreements contain tariff scales and salary plans, and therefore the norm on the settlement of inter-qualification (inter-job) ratios in labor remuneration is fully implemented. However, no sectoral

agreement provides a unified wage scale for all categories and occupational groups of workers in the industry.

Sectoral agreements of the studied industries fully/partially regulate such issues of wages and social security as minimum social guarantees, utilities, rehabilitation, recreation, medical, and cultural services.

The practice of duplicating legislative norms and norms of the general agreement by sectoral agreements cannot be considered positive. Enterprises are obliged to comply with legal norms, regardless of whether the sectoral agreement provides them. In this regard, we consider that sectoral agreements should include only those rules that expand the list of guarantees and incentives or offer higher payments.

The practice of appealing to the regulation of relevant norms by collective agreements at enterprises is widespread, which indicates the processes of decentralization of collective wage bargaining from the sectoral to the organizational level.

The number of obligations of the social parties is an important indicator. A comparison of the number of obligations on wages and social security in the agreements of studied industries is given in Table 4.

Table 4. Comparison of the Number of Obligations on Wages and Social Security in the Agreements of the Industries Examined

Agreements	Number of joint commitments / parties agreed	The number of obligations of the employers	The number of obligations of the trade unions	<i>The total number of obligations</i>
<i>Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020</i>				
wage obligations	8	18	2	28
social security obligations	6	1	3	10
<i>total number</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020</i>				
wage obligations	-	26	-	26
social security obligations	-	21	-	21
<i>total number</i>	-	<i>47</i>	-	<i>47</i>
<i>Sectoral agreement of the aviation industry for 2019-2020</i>				
wage obligations	1	35	6	42
social security obligations	-	34	9	43
<i>total number</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>85</i>
<i>Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018</i>				

wage obligations	5	33	2	40
social security obligations	-	21	6	27
<i>total number</i>	5	54	8	67
<i>Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014</i>				
wage obligations	2	38	3	43
social security obligations	20	17	3	40
<i>total number</i>	22	55	6	83
<i>Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012</i>				
wage obligations	3	23	3	29
social security obligations	5	20	7	32
<i>total number</i>	8	43	10	61
<i>Sectoral agreement of the coal industry</i>				
wage obligations	2	39	1	42
social security obligations	6	7	3	16
<i>total number</i>	8	46	4	58

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

According to the data in Table 4, agreements in the aviation industry and oil and gas industry contain the largest number of obligations and the smallest number – in the agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry. If we analyze the number of obligations in terms of specific subjects of industrial relations, we see that there are too many joint agreements of the parties in the sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry. This practice cannot be considered successful in terms of the personification of those responsible for the implementation of the obligations.

It is necessary to pay attention to the small number or absence (in the agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry) of trade union obligations, which undermines their role in regulating wages. In this respect, the best practice in the aviation industry can be considered, as the sectoral agreement provides for a maximum (15) number of trade union obligations on wages. However, the share of trade union obligations in the total number remains very small at 18%.

The ratio of the number of specific obligations to the total number of obligations of the social parties on wages and social security according to the sectoral agreements is given in Table 4.

Table 5. Ratio of the number of specific obligations to the total number of obligations of the social parties on wages and social security according to the sectoral agreements

Agreements	Specific obligations		General obligations	
	number	% of the total	number	% of the total
Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020	22	58	16	42
Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020	42	89	5	11
Sectoral agreement of the aviation industry for 2019-2020	72	85	13	15
Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018	56	84	11	16
Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014	63	76	20	24
Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012	53	87	8	13
Sectoral agreement of the coal industry	43	74	15	26

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

According to the given data, the most successful in this indicator is the practice in the chemical and petrochemical industries and the mining and metallurgical industry. Among the least successful is the practice of regulating wages in the machine-building and instrument-making industry, where only 58% of commitments are specific.

Some provisions of sectoral agreements are vague, and generic, and do not contain specific mechanisms for implementing the commitments. There is a lack of personification of responsible persons.

The following group of indicators characterizes the specific wage commitments of the social parties. The first indicator is the *obligations of the parties to wage growth in the sectoral agreement*.

The highest growth rates of wages are declared in the sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry – 125% annually based on the financial capabilities of enterprises, but not below the level established by the general agreement. The agreement provides for an increase in wages by at least 16% annually after its expiration. Because the agreement was signed for 2012-2014, the rule of 16 per cent growth in average wages annually is now in force.

The sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry provides for an annual increase in average wages of at least 18% provided based on the rising efficiency of production.

The parties of the agreement of the aviation industry have pledged to raise wages by at least 10% above official inflation, twice a year. Thus, among the studied industries, the obligations of the parties to this agreement are the highest (considering the term of the agreement, the amount, and the frequency of wage increases).

Sectoral agreements of the machine-building and instrument-making, and the coal industries provide for the obligation to increase the basic wage taking into account the growth of the minimum wage at the legislative level.

The sectoral agreement in the energy and electric power industry also does not specify the size of the increase in wages. The agreement defines the factors that should affect wage growth: macroeconomic indicators set by the government, labor market conditions, financial resources, production and financial and economic indicators of the enterprise, the norms of the general agreement, and current legislation.

The sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry does not contain obligations of the social parties to increase wages, which reduces the effectiveness of the agreement as a tool to ensure decent work, including decent wages.

The next important indicator is the *obligation to increase the share of wages in gross expenditures*.

More than half of the sectoral agreements (in the machine-building and instrument-making, aviation, energy and electric power, and oil and gas industries) contain commitments of the parties to increase the share of wages in gross expenditures.

At the same time, only the sectoral agreement of the aviation industry specifies the target indicators of the share of wages in gross expenditures: industrial enterprises reaching at least 25%, and research, design, and technology enterprises — at least 30%.

The lack of target indicators does not contribute to the proper implementation of obligations by the parties, especially by the employers.

The following group of indicators characterizes the *commitment of the social parties to regulate basic wages*. A comparison of the obligations of the social parties to regulate the basic wage according to the sectoral agreements is given in Table 6.

Table 6. Comparison of obligations of the social parties to regulate the basic wage according to the sectoral agreements

Agreements	Share of basic salary in the remuneration, %	The ratio of the basic wage of the worker of the 1st category and the minimum wage provided by law, %	Range of 6-category tariff scale for workers (maximum if there are several tariff scales)	Range of salary scale for managers and specialists (maximum if there are several salary scales)
Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020	70	100	2.0	3.3
Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020	60	120	2.18	3.14
Sectoral agreement of the aviation industry for 2019-2020	65-70	150	2.2	3.0
Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018	70	130	2.7	8.0
Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-	70	135	1.8	4.71

2014				
Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012	60	105	1.81	2.91
Sectoral agreement of the coal industry	70	there is no data for 2021	2.7	7.03

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

As for the share of basic salary in the remuneration, all agreements of the studied industries set this indicator at the level of 60-70%. It is a good practice, as the basic salary is a constant, stable part of the remuneration for work that the employer must pay employees if the monthly norm of working hours is completed. The high share of the basic salary allows for meeting the needs of workers in safety and security.

As for the ratio of the basic wage of the worker of the 1st category and the minimum wage provided by law, the aviation industry is in the lead on this indicator. The sectoral agreement of the aviation industry stipulates the basic wage of the worker of the 1st category at the level of 150% of the minimum wage provided by law. The lowest value of this indicator is in the sectoral agreement in the machine-building and instrument-making industry – 100%.

The sectoral agreement of the coal industry contains old data in monetary units for 2001, which does not allow for assessing the effectiveness of this indicator in current socio-economic conditions.

Regarding the ranges of tariff scale for workers, as shown in Table 6, sectoral agreements of oil and gas, mining, and metallurgical industries contain tariff scales for remuneration of workers with a range of less than 2. Sectoral agreements in the machine-building and instrument-making, chemical and petrochemical, aviation, and mining and metallurgical industries contain salary scales for managers and specialists with ranges of less than 4.

Such tariff and salary scales do not allow for objective differentiation of the basic salary depending on the complexity of duties and work, level of responsibility, and the importance of certain positions and professions for the company and industry. Such remuneration systems do not perform a motivational function, as they do not encourage employees to improve their skills, grow professionally, or perform more complex and responsible work.

The next indicator is the difference between the basic salaries of workers and specialists of two related categories. This difference must be at least 10%, so-called the sensitivity threshold, which is the minimum difference. The difference in the size of salaries below the sensitivity threshold does not allow considering the difference in the complexity of duties, in the level of responsibility, thus ensuring objective differentiation of basic salary.

The analysis showed that none of the agreements in the studied industries includes tariff and salary scales which provide the sensitivity threshold to the basic salary of all categories and occupational groups of employees. It means that none of the wage systems regulated by the agreements of the studied industries provides an objective differentiation of the basic salary. The analysis of sectoral agreements also showed that none of them employs analytical methods for assessing positions and jobs during the development of tariff and salary scales. The lack of appropriate tools for measuring the complexity and importance of work and responsibilities does not allow for designing effective remuneration systems.

Effective remuneration systems are flexible. They allow individualizing the basic salary depending on the competencies of employees, their achievements, work experience (as an indicator of their loyalty to the enterprise), and work results.

The analysis of agreements in the studied industries showed that agreements of the energy, electrical, and coal industries contain flexible remuneration systems. It is a positive practice in terms of encouraging employees to improve competencies and performance and stay longer in the enterprise or industry. However, these agreements do not develop criteria for establishing the basic salary of employees within the developed ranges. The agreements also do not contain recommendations for managers of enterprises to develop such criteria to prevent the subjectivity of managers in setting the basic salary of employees within the ranges.

The next indicator for assessing the development of the social partnership is the *compliance of the list, amount, and procedure for payment of additional payments and increases to the legal norms and norms of the general agreement.*

The analysis of agreements of the studied industries showed that the list, amounts, and procedures for payment of additional payments and increases comply with the legal norms and norms of the general agreement. A comparative analysis has shown that they are practically identical, except for certain industry-specific payments. Although sectoral agreements may contain additional obligations of the social parties on wages and higher amounts of various benefits, almost all agreements

duplicate the list of additional payments and increases provided by the general agreement.

The following indicator reflects *the spread of stock options and profit-sharing plans*. *Stock options and profit-sharing plans* increase employees' involvement in the performance and collective results, team spirit, and loyalty to the company, and, consequently, reduce staff turnover. It, in turn, contributes to the development of corporate culture, the core values of which are recognition of the importance of each employee, teamwork, and loyalty to the enterprise. The lack of obligations of the social parties to implement such plans does not contribute to the development of the social partnership.

Among the studied industries, no agreement provides for obligations or recommendations for employers to implement *stock options and profit-sharing plans*. *The obligation of the social parties to introduce social packages and social insurance programs* is also an important indicator.

The analysis showed that only the agreement of the aviation industry provides for the introduction of social packages in enterprises. Although other ones do not contain such obligations, they include a significant number of provisions for providing various social benefits to employees (Table 3). The commitment of the social parties to the social security of workers indicates that management not only seeks to maximize profits but also attaches great importance to meeting the social needs of employees, creating decent working conditions, and preserving and enriching human capital. It also shows that employers understand the importance of social benefits for developing long-term partnerships with employees. The assessment of the parties' obligations to implement social insurance programs in the enterprises of the studied industries is given in Table 7.

Table 7. The assessment of the parties' obligations to implement social insurance programs in the enterprises of the studied industries

Agreements	Insurance programs				Total number
	medical	pension	Accident	unemployment	
Sectoral agreement of the machine-building and instrument-making industry for 2016-2020	-	-	-	-	0
Sectoral agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry for 2017-2020	+	-	+	+	3
Sectoral agreement	+	+	+	-	3

of the aviation industry for 2019-2020					
Sectoral agreement of the energy and electric power industry for 2016-2018	+	+	-	-	2
Sectoral agreement of the oil and gas industry for 2012-2014	-	+	-	-	1
Sectoral agreement of the mining and metallurgical industry for 2011-2012	+	+	+	-	3
Sectoral agreement of the coal industry	-	-	-	-	0

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

According to the data in Table 7, only two agreements (in the machine-building and instrument-making and the coal industries) do not contain obligations of providing insurance programs for employees. The most common insurance programs are medical and pension. Unemployment insurance is not widespread: only the agreement of the chemical and petrochemical industry provides this type of insurance.

The next indicator is the *obligations of the social parties on providing gender equality in wages*. The importance of this indicator is related to Ukraine's integration into the European community which requires the development of all social institutions and processes on democratic principles that prevent any discrimination, including one related to gender. In this regard, social partnership institutions should introduce tools that eliminate any discrimination and help reduce the gender pay gap. According to the data in Table 3, not all agreements contain *obligations* of the social parties to ensure equal rights and opportunities for women and men, and therefore gender equality in wages. The absence of such commitments negatively characterizes the state of social partnership development. The next indicator is *the rate of coverage of employees by collective agreements on the organizational level*. The rate of coverage of employees by collective agreements is given in Table 8. It should be noted that the State Statistics Service of Ukraine provides statistical information on industries according to the national classification of economic activities. In this regard, in Table 8 names of industries are slightly different from the names contained on the website of the service. In addition, the State

Statistics Service of Ukraine⁶³ does not publish data separately for the aviation industry, and the data are provided for the transport industry as a whole. According to the data, there is a high rate of coverage of employees by collective agreements in the studied industries: more than the average in the economy of Ukraine. The highest coverage rate is in the aviation industry (96.4%), and the lowest is in the mining and metallurgical industry (78.9%).

Table 8. Rate of coverage of employees by collective agreements on the organizational level in 2021

Industries	Number of employees covered by collective agreements on the organizational level, % of the number of full-time employees
<i>Economy of Ukraine</i>	71.8
Machine-building and instrument-making industry	79.8
Chemical and petrochemical industry	80.8
Aviation industry	96.4
Energy and electric power industry	92.1
Oil and gas industry	94.5
Mining and metallurgical industry	78.9
Coal industry	94.9

Source: compiled according to data (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2020).

4.2. Calculation of an Integrated Index of the Development Rate of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation

The initial information for the calculation of an integrated index of the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation is given in Table 9.

⁶³ State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Statistical information.

Table 9. Initial Information for the Calculation of an Integrated Index of the Development Rate of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation

Indicators	Standard	X_{max}	X_{min}
1	Yes	-	-
2	Yes	-	-
3	Yes	-	-
4	Yes	-	-
5	→ max (100)	87.5	50
6	→ max	85	38
7	→ max (100)	89	58
8	→ max (≥ 110)	121	116
9	Yes	-	-
10	→ max (> 60)	70	60
11	→ max (≥ 110)	150	100
12	≥ 2	6.35	1.8
13	≥ 4	8.0	2.91
14	≥ 10	-	-
15	Yes	-	-
16	Yes	-	-
17	Yes	-	-
18	Yes	-	-
19	Yes	-	-
20	yes (→ max)	3	0
21	Yes	-	-
22	→ max (100)	96.4	78.9

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

The calculation of an integrated index of the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation in the studied industries is given in Table 10.

Table 10. Calculation of an Integrated Index of the Development Rate of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation in the Industries Considered

Indicators	Individual indices (I_i)						
	Machine-building and instrument-making	Chemical and petrochemical industry	Aviation industry	Energy and electric power industry	Oil and gas industry	Mining and metallurgical industry	Coal industry
1	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
2	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
4	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000
5	0.0000	0.6667	1.0000	0.3333	0.6667	1.0000	0.3333
6	0.0000	0.1915	1.0000	0.6170	0.9574	0.4894	0.4255
7	0.0000	1.0000	0.8710	0.8387	0.5806	0.9355	0.5161


8	0.5000	0.0000	1.0000	0.5000	0.5000	0.5000	0.5000
9	1.0000	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000
10	1.0000	0.0000	0.5000	1.0000	1.0000	0.0000	1.0000
11	0.0000	0.4000	1.0000	0.6000	0.7000	0.1000	0.0000
12	0.2222	0.4222	0.4444	1.0000	0.0000	0.0111	1.0000
13	0.0766	0.0452	0.0177	1.0000	0.3536	0.0000	0.8094
14	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
15	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
16	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000
17	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
18	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
19	0.5000	0.5000	1.0000	0.5000	0.5000	0.5000	0.5000
20	0.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.6667	0.3333	1.0000	0.0000
21	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000
22	0.0514	0.1086	1.0000	0.7543	0.8914	0.0000	0.9143
<i>Integrated index</i>	<i>0.2886</i>	<i>0.4243</i>	<i>0.5833</i>	<i>0.5823</i>	<i>0.4765</i>	<i>0.3880</i>	<i>0.4545</i>

Source: compiled by the authors

4.3. Clustering of Industries according to the Development Rate of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation

The clustering of industries according to the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation is shown in Fig. 1.

Figure 1. Clustering of Industries according to the Rate of Development of the Social Partnership in Wage Regulation



Source: compiled by the authors, 2023. Note: 1 – Machine-building and instrument-making, 2 – Mining and metallurgical industry, 3 – Chemical and petrochemical industry, 4 – Coal industry, 5 – Oil and gas industry, 6 – Energy and electric power industry, 7 – Aviation industry.

The evaluation results showed that none of the studied industries is in the clusters with high and above-average social partnership development rates. Most of them are at an average rate. The chemical, petrochemical, and coal industries found themselves in a cluster with a below-average rate.

The situation in the aviation and energy and electric power industries is the most favorable concerning developing the social partnership in wage regulation. The lowest rate has the machine-building and instrument-making industry.

Each of the studied industries has at least five indicators of an individual index at the level of the maximum value (1.0000). The largest number of indicators with the maximum values of individual indices was recorded in the aviation industry — 11, which is 50% of the total. Most industries have maximum values of individual indices for 5-6 indicators. This indicates that each of the studied industries has its own best practices for the development and implementation of remuneration policies based on social partnership, which should be extended to the other industries.

At the same time, all studied industries have at least six indicators with individual indices of zero value, which indicates the presence of weaknesses in wage policies. The machine-building and instrument-making industry have the most indicators with the minimum value of indices – 12, which is more than 50% of the total. The energy and electric power industry has the lowest number of indicators with zero values of individual indices – 6, which is still too high.

Policymakers and social parties (employers' organizations, trade unions) should focus primarily on the indicators with the lowest, including zero values of individual indices.

4.4. Assessment of the Impact of the Social Partnership Development on the Material Well-being of Employees

We propose to assess the material well-being of employees in the studied industries by the following indicators:

- 1) wage growth rates in the industry during 2018-2020;
- 2) the ratio of average wages in the industry to the average rate of wages in the economy;
- 3) the share of the basic salary in the wage fund of the industry;
- 4) arrears of wages per 1 employee in the industry;
- 5) the ratio of women's wages to men's wages.

Indicators that characterize material well-being in the studied industries are given in Table 11.

Table 11. Indicators that Characterize Material Well-being in the Industries Selected

	Wage growth rates in the industry during 2018-2020, %	The ratio of average wages in the industry to the average wage in the economy in 2020	The share of the basic salary in the wage fund of the industry, %	Arrears of wages per 1 employee in the industry as of 01.01.2021	The ratio of women's wages to men's wages, %
Machine-building and instrument-making	128	0.94	54.7	5711.87	78.8
Chemical and petrochemical industry	141	1.07	60.3	1668.59	77.6
Aviation industry	61	1.87	53.7	443.05	89.7
Energy and electric power industry	155	1.44	55.3	165.43	80.6
Oil and gas industry	135	1.45	50.1	1853.01	61.5
Mining and metallurgical industry	126	1.2	55.3	1193.28	76.7
Coal industry	129	1.35	42	3310.64	47.2

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

To calculate an integrated index of the material well-being of employees in the industry, we use the method of assessing an integrated index of the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation. The

individual index of the indicator of arrears of wages is calculated by the formula

$$I_i = \frac{[X_{actual} - X_{max}]}{[X_{min} - X_{max}]} \quad (4)$$

To calculate the individual indices for other indicators that characterize the material well-being we used formula (1). The results of calculating the integrated index of the employees' material well-being in the studied industries are given in Table 12.


Table 12 The results of calculating the integrated index of the employees' material well-being in the studied industries

Indicator	Single index						
	Machine-building and instrument-making	Chemical and petrochemical industry	Aviation industry	Energy and electric power industry	Oil and gas industry	Mining and metallurgical industry	Coal industry
1	0.7128	0.8511	0.0000	1.0000	0.7872	0.6915	0.7234
2	0.0000	0.1398	1.0000	0.5376	0.5484	0.2796	0.4409
3	0.6940	1.0000	0.6393	0.7268	0.4426	0.7268	0.0000
4	0.0000	0.7290	0.9499	1.0000	0.6957	0.8147	0.4329
5	0.7435	0.7153	1.0000	0.7859	0.3365	0.6941	0.0000
Integrated index	0.4301	0.6870	0.7179	0.8101	0.5621	0.6413	0.3194

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

The clustering of industries according to the value of the employees' material well-being is shown in Fig. 2.

Figure 2. Clustering of Industries According to the Value of Employees' Material Well-Being



Source: compiled by the authors. Note: 1 – Coal industry, 2 – Machine-building and instrument-making, 3 – Oil and gas industry, 4 – Mining and metallurgical industry, 5 – Chemical and petrochemical industry, 6 – Aviation industry, 7 – Energy and electric power industry.

According to the integrated index of the material well-being value, the studied industries differ considerably. The energy and electric power industry is in the cluster with a high rate of material well-being, and the coal industry has a below-average value. The classification of industries according to the development rate of the social partnership and the employees' material well-being is given in Table 13.

Table 13. Classification of Industries according to the Development Rate of the Social Partnership and Employees' Material Well-being

The rate of material well-being	The development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation				
	Low	Below average	Average	Above average	High
Low	-	-	-	-	-
Below average	-	-	coal industry	-	-
Average	-	machine-building and instrument-making	oil and gas industry		
Above average	-	mining and metallurgical industry	chemical and petrochemical industry, aviation industry	-	-
High	-	-	energy and electric power industry	-	-

Source: compiled by the authors, 2023.

The correlation coefficient calculated between the social partnership's development rate and employees' material well-being is equal to 0.59. It indicates a high positive correlation between these indicators. Thus, we can state that the development of the social partnership in wage regulation has a positive effect on the level of employees' material well-being in general.

We also assessed the impact of the development rate of the social partnership on separate indicators that characterize the rate of material well-being. The tightest positive correlations are with the following ones:

- The ratio of average wages in the industry to the average wage in the economy (correlation coefficient equals 0.87);
- Arrears of wages (more precisely their absence) per 1 employee (correlation coefficient — 0.82).

There is a low positive correlation between the development rate of the social partnership and the ratio of women's wages to men's ones (correlation coefficient equals 0.17). The social partnership can have little effect on reducing the gender pay gap.

There is almost no relationship between the development rate of the social partnership and the share of basic wages in the wage fund (the correlation coefficient is 0.09).

A low negative correlation is between the development rate of the social partnership and the wage growth rates in the industry (correlation coefficient equals -0.27).

5. Discussion

It is necessary to note some limitations of this study. While the degree of fulfillment of obligations by social parties is an important indicator, the practice of publishing reports by the social parties on the implementation of commitments included in sectoral agreements in Ukraine is absent. It is impossible to check the degree of implementing obligations of a general (non-specific) nature. Fulfillment of some obligations should be studied separately at each enterprise in the industry. However, we made the evident conclusion that social parties have fulfilled not all commitments. We made this conclusion based on the fact that all agreements contain obligations of parties to solve problems with arrears of wages. However, the analysis of the data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine showed that all industries had wage arrears. Due to the lack of complete information on the extent to which the social parties comply with the provisions of sectoral agreements, this indicator was not taken into account when calculating the integrated index.

We have accepted in the methodology for assessing the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation that the proposed indicators are equivalent. However, it would be reasonable to determine the significance of indicators using the expert method, which should be the next area of research and improvement of the methodology.

Essential indicators that characterize the employees' material well-being, and in particular the fair income distribution, are indicators of estimating wage differentiation — Gini and decile coefficients. Due to the lack of statistical information on these indicators by industries, we did not consider them when assessing the correlation between the development rate of the social partnership and the employees' material well-being.

The research methodology on the development rate of the social partnership can be changed and adapted according to the research purposes and tasks, information base, and target priorities of the social and economic development of industries. Due to the decentralization of regulation of industrial relations, it is also necessary to adapt the methodology for studying developing social partnerships at the micro-level.

The developed methodology focuses on assessing the rate of development of traditional industrial relations and does not consider such current

trends in the labor market as non-standard (precarious) employment, work from home, or remote work, and therefore the specifics of industrial relations and remuneration of such employees.

6. Conclusions

As a result of the assessment of the development rate of the social partnership in wage regulation in industries, positive and negative characteristics were identified.

Among the positive characteristics are recognition of the agreement as a legal act of social partnership by all parties; the existence of a procedure for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the social parties' obligations; the presence in some agreements of the parties' obligations to increase the share of wages in gross expenditures, to introduce social packages and social insurance programs at enterprises; high level of coverage of employees by collective agreements.

Characteristics that negatively describe social partnership in the studied industries include delays in signing sectoral agreements; lack of personification of responsible officials for implementing provisions in most sectoral agreements; unregulated part of the norms on the remuneration according to the legislation; low share of trade union commitments; a significant share of general (non-specific) obligations of the social parties; unsatisfactory differentiation of the basic salary; the limited practice of using modern remuneration systems, employee participation in *stock options and profit-sharing plans*.

The evaluation results showed that none of the studied industries is in the clusters with high and above-average social partnership development rates. Most of them are at an average rate. The situation in the aviation and energy and electric power industries is the most favorable concerning developing the social partnership in wage regulation. Each of the studied industries has inherent best practices for developing remuneration policies based on social partnership.

The analysis showed a high positive correlation between the social partnership's development rate and employees' material well-being. Thus, we can state that the development of the social partnership in wage regulation has a positive effect on the level of material well-being of employees in general.

The tightest positive correlations are between the development rate of the social partnership and such indicators as the ratio of average wages in the industry to the average wage in the economy and arrears of wages (more precisely their absence) per 1 employee.

This study showed a fairly high potential effectiveness of social partnership instruments in regulating wages at the sectoral level. Policymakers and social parties (organizations of employers, trade unions) should study and disseminate best practices in developing and implementing policies of wages regulation based on social partnership, which is crucial for strengthening trust in the institution of social partnership and the ability of parties to create the conditions for decent work.

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